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Introduction 
The fall of communism in 1989 across Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) has ushered in a decade of 
transitologists. Epitomized in EBRD’s annual Transition Reports, international institutions, global 
academic community and observers at large have sought to analyse, theorize and advise governments 
on the building of capitalist democracies from the ruins of socialist command economies (see de Batt, 
1990; de Melo et al., 1996; Åslund, 2002; Dylon & Wykoff, 2002). By the 2000s, transitology gave way 
to comparative analysis, as scholars of various theoretical backgrounds argued for the formation of 
substantively different varieties of capitalism in the post-communist region (Cernat, 2006; Lane & 
Myant, 2007; Bohle & Greskovits, 2007; Drahokoupil, 2009; Drahokoupil & Myant, 2011). The 2008/9 
financial crisis has opened up new avenues for research, particularly how the different political 
economies in CEE adjust to external economic shocks. Building on the existing literature, this article 
begins by proposing a theoretical framework for an analysis of the process of crisis adjustment in CEE 
with a view to exploring two of its dimensions. The first is economic: has there been an economic 
recovery and if so, what were its drivers and beneficiaries? The second is concerned with the social 
costs: how was the burden of fiscal adjustment that accompanied the crisis distributed? Ultimately, 
the article seeks to identify the implications of this episode for the East European variants of 
capitalism.  
The immediate adverse impact of the crisis on CEE has been well documented. It was noted that the 
region was the hardest hit out of the whole world, though the severity of the downturn varied among 
different countries (Berglöf et al., 2009). This was traced to the build-up of pre-crisis vulnerabilities 
and the specifics of crisis exposure (Mitra & Čihák, 2009; Drahokoupil & Myant, 2011; 2012; Marer, 
2013). Using econometric analysis, Connolly argued for the severity of recessions in CEE to have been 
determined by three macro-financial variables (Connolly, 2012). Others predicted a sluggish recovery 
(Korniyenko et al., 2012). International Financial Institutions (IFIs), providing direct assistance to some 
countries of the region, have produced numerous analyses of the pre-crisis growth models, crisis 
exposure, and future prospects (Mody et al. 2009; Mitra et al., 2010; Bakker & Klingen, 2012; EBRD, 
2009). All these accounts have as a rule been pre-occupied with the pre-crisis period and come in the 
form of pan-regional analyses, or case studies tracking different indicators that are not readily 
comparable. This article seeks to provide a comparative analysis of the dynamics of post-crisis 
economic performance in Central-Eastern Europe. To avoid possible conceptual controversies in 
constructing a single indicator, economic performance of countries is proxied by tracking GDP growth 
and its composition, developments in foreign trade, and changes in the labour market. Although the 
choice of variables is arbitrary, together they construct a useful multi-dimensional conception of the 
economy, from the macro (GDP), through structural (trade) to the human layer (labour market). The 
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similarities and differences across countries are thus noted, performance is comparatively evaluated 
and factors underpinning it discussed.  
Fiscal consolidation episodes over the last half a century have received considerable attention, though 
as a rule in their relation to enhancing growth (Mauro 2011; Sutherland et al., 2012; Moral-Benito & 
de Cos, 2013), while ‘there has been little systematic analysis of the distributional effects of fiscal 
consolidations’ (Woo et al., 2013: p.2). Among CEE countries, the Baltic fiscal adjustment strategy has 
attracted considerable attention, although its distributional impacts have been left implied (Purfield 
& Rosenberg, 2010; Kattel & Raudla 2011; 2013a; 2013b). Drahokoupil et al. assess the policy 
responses to the crisis in the Visegrad states for their distributional impacts, categorizing them as 
social-democratic or neo-liberal, albeit without devising a common yardstick (Drahokoupil et al., 
2013). While these have been an important source of inspiration, this article seeks to place the 
countries’ public sector adjustment strategies along a progressive / regressive axis by constructing a 
composite indicator capturing the distributional impacts of measures pursued. Although the exercise 
is evidence-based, it requires a degree of simplification and judgement. Nevertheless, it allows for 
useful comparison, while shedding light on the determinants of measures pursued.  
While economic performance and strategies of fiscal consolidation are usually considered in 
conjunction and are no doubt interrelated, for the purpose of this article, they are treated as two 
analytically distinct categories that together construct the larger whole. The gathered data provides a 
basis for revealing the factors underpinning the overall course of crisis adjustment in CEE. Have 
countries with low pre-crisis imbalances economically outperformed the more vulnerable ones? Have 
specific policies been decisive in returning a country to prosperity? Concerning the distribution of 
costs, can the progressiveness of fiscal adjustment be explained by the scope of potential social 
dislocation, or the extent of organised opposition to welfare retrenchment? And while the dominant 
assumption throughout the 2000s was that the region’s ‘social and economic structures… are there to 
stay and shape the developments for some time to come’ (Drahokoupil, 2009: p.279), the article 
addresses how the experience has shaped the region’s variants of capitalism.  
The first part constructs an analytical framework for a systematic analysis of crisis adjustment in post-
communist Europe and justifies the choice of countries. Hypotheses and methodology are presented 
in the next sections, followed by the presentation of the findings. The next section assesses these, 
relating them to the earlier hypotheses. A re-construction of the different dynamics of adjustment 
and their implications follows. Ultimately, conclusions are drawn. 
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1. Analytical Framework 
This section presents first presents a literature review of the attempts to map the basic contours of 
CEE’s political economies, which have inspired the analytical framework adopted in this article.   
1.1 Conceptualizing Capitalism in Central-Eastern Europe  
In what later became a classic in comparative political economy, Peter Katzenstein (1985) observed 
that in the decades after Second World War ‘democratic corporatism’ – a distinct set of national 
institutional arrangements – has enabled a group of small West European states to deal effectively 
with adverse economic shocks emanating from the global economy. Accordingly, democratic 
corporatism has been underpinned by a shared ideology of social partnership, a relatively centralized 
and concentrated system of interest groups at the national level, and voluntary and informal 
coordination of conflicting objectives through continuous bargaining between interest groups, state 
bureaucracies and political parties (Katzenstein, 1985; p.32-3). Characteristic of the logic of 
adjustment has been 'external liberalization and domestic compensation... with a close link between 
the political and economic requirements of economic adjustment' (Ibid, 1985; p.29). For Katzenstein, 
the success of adjustment was measured as 'the extent to which social coalitions, political institutions, 
and public policies facilitate or impede shifts in the factors of production that increase economic 
efficiency with due regards to the requirements of political legitimacy' (Ibid, p.29). Katzenstein’s 
central thesis was that owing to their political representativeness, economic flexibility and social 
inclusion, the democratic corporatist arrangements would be reinforced over time. In other words, 
the small West European states were bound for success.  
 
Although the accuracy of Katzenstein’s proposition has become contested (see Jones, 2008; Schwartz, 
1994; 2010; Ingebritsen, 2010), democratic corporatism offered an attractive model for the East 
European states to adopt. In a later article, Katzenstein argued that the transition from socialism to 
capitalism and accelerating process of Europeanization ‘could be viewed as functional equivalents’ of 
the political and economic shocks of 1930s and 1940s, which, in his account, prompted the West 
European states to instate corporatist institutions (Katzenstein, 1985: Ch.4). Indeed, Iankova argued 
that out of a need to maintain social cohesion in the turbulent 1990s, ‘transformative corporatism’ 
has taken hold in Central-Eastern Europe (Iankova, 1998; 2002). Her account has been dismissed by 
Ost, who maintained that corporatism in CEE was purely illusory, and only served ‘to secure the 
labour’s acceptance of its own marginalization’ and ‘achieve neoliberal outcomes’ (Ost, 2000: p.503). 
Commenting on the debate, Katzenstein stated that ‘if we had to choose one label under which to 
subsume their [CEE countries] different experiences, then it would probably be European-style 
welfare capitalism’ (Katzenstein, 2003: p.22). 
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Yet it was precisely the attempt to subsume all of Central-Eastern Europe under one label and 
insufficient attention paid to the regional variation that was perhaps the weakest spot in the accounts 
of authors from the corporatist tradition. Explaining this variation has become the central objective 
for comparative analysts in the 2000s, predominantly under the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
approach (Hall & Soskice, 2001). The VoC approach represents a powerful account of how specific 
institutional arrangements induce firms to coordinate their activities on the micro (firm level) and 
macro (economy level) scale in order to innovate and remain competitive in the global economy. The 
two superior configurations identified by the authors – the Liberal Market Economy (LME) typified by 
the US, and Coordinated Market Economy (CME) typified by Germany – fundamentally differ across 
five core socio-economic institutions. Whereas in LMEs firm relations, corporate governance, 
financing, industrial relations and skill reproduction are characterized by a logic of arms-length market 
relations, in the CMEs these are defined by a logic of strategic interaction, cooperation and consensus. 
Consequently, the LMEs are particularly well fitted to produce radical innovations, while given their 
longer time-horizon, firms in CMEs specialize in sectors where incremental innovation is key to 
success. In instances of exogenous shocks, the different institutional settings frame the payoffs of 
different adjustment strategies that firms might pursue. While the firms in LMEs tend to focus on 
short-term profitability, lay-off workers and push for more liberalization, firms in CMEs prefer to 
maintain market shares and employment levels, accepting temporary declines in profitability (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001: p.55-60).  
 
The 2000s have witnessed burgeoning literature exploring the variation in Central-Eastern Europe 
through the VoC lenses (Lane, 2007; Lane & Myant, 2007; Hancke et al., 2007). Popular among the 
authors has been to contrast Slovenia and Estonia, as case-points of a CME and LME respectively 
(McMenamin, 2004; Lane 2005; Feldmann, 2005; 2006; Buchen, 2007). Some attempted to construct 
a coordination index capturing the relative positions of CEE political economies along the CME-LME 
axis (Bobos, 2010). However, the underlying assumption that the framework is readily transposable 
from the developed Western to the nascent post-communist capitalist economies, despite their 
fundamentally different histories, political cultures and levels of economic development, is highly 
questionable. Some authors went so far as to dispute the validity of the assumption that national 
comparative advantage in CEE is indeed underpinned by complimentary institutional arrangements, 
and argued that provided secure property rights, it is structural factors – such as geographical 
proximity, level of education and cost of labour – which, in fact, matter (Greskovits, 2005; Myant, 
2007; Drahokoupil, 2009). It could be argued that the mechanical application of the VoC framework 
to the CEE region has reflected, more than anything, its popularity among academics. 
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In an attempt to rescue the VoC, Nölke and Vliegenthart centred their analysis on ‘the fundamental 
dependence of the CEE economies on investment decisions of transnational corporations’ (Nölke & 
Vliegenthart, 2009: p.676). The authors have thus constructed a third typology – the Dependent 
Market Economy (DME) – capturing the Visegrad political economies. In the DME, the central 
coordination mechanism is the hierarchy within transnational corporations, through which local 
subsidiaries of TNCs are controlled and financed from the headquarters, and in which technology is 
transferred within the TNCs production networks. Selective company-level agreements dominate the 
industrial relations, while the TNCs pursue only limited involvement in skills-reproduction. Given the 
preference of TNCs for conducting innovation-heavy activities at their headquarters, the DMEs 
comparative advantage ‘is not based on radical innovation (LMEs) or incremental innovation (CMEs), 
but rather on an assembly platform semistandardized industrial goods’ (Nölke & Vliegenthart, 2009: 
p.679). While the DME typology marks an improvement on the original VoC dichotomy, it also suffers 
from severe deficiencies. Its application to just four countries of the region and ignorance of the varied 
regional forms of dependence render its practical utility in comparative research on capitalism in CEE 
extremely limited. And through its strict emphasis on the hierarchy within TNCs, ‘the variation in socio-
economic models identified by the VoC research is lost’ while ‘the coordination mechanisms within 
MNCs remain black boxed’ (Drahokoupil, 2009: p.295). However reinvented, the firm-centred, and 
thoroughly mechanical VoC approach (Lane & Wood, 2011) seems to offer a poor starting point for 
the study of the region’s crisis adjustment and change.  
 
Departing from the VoC, Drahokoupil and Myant have constructed five typologies of post-communist 
political economies. Based on their particular form of international integration and key internal 
characteristics, such as the nature of property rights, the role of the state and the nature of the 
relation between the state and main economic actors, these are (1) FDI-based and (2) peripheral 
market economies, (3) oligarchic-clientelistic capitalism, (4) order states and (5) reemitance- and aid-
based economies (Drahokoupil & Mynat, 2011: Ch.16). While the latter three are typified by Russia, 
Ukraine and countries in Central Asia, the authors propose two typologies for the most Western states 
of the former Soviet empire. Accordingly, the Visegrad and Slovenian economies fit in the first 
category and are ‘distinguished by democratic political systems, integration into the European Union… 
complex export structures increasingly built around foreign-owned MNCs’ granting them ‘second-rank 
positions in international production networks’ (Drahokoupil & Mynat, 2011: p.310). Labour 
protection and welfare provision in the five countries has been relatively high. The South East 
European and Baltic economies are conceived as peripheral market economies, defined by 
‘democratic political systems and basic and institutional conditions for business’, though relying less 
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on stable manufactured exports and associated with ‘financialized growth and reliance on re-
emitances’ which render them ‘less equipped to withstand external shocks’ (Ibid: p.311). In these 
states, welfare provision tends to be significantly lower than in the FDI-based variety. 
The above taxonomy offers a more workable framework relative to the more mechanical VoC, though 
it too has its limitations. On the positive side, the strengths and weaknesses of the various economic 
models and domestic welfare institutions invite an analysis of their adjustment to external shocks, 
opening up the possibility of change, the shifting of countries from one variant to another, or the 
emergence of altogether new types. On the other hand, the authors’ preoccupation with the whole 
of the post-Soviet space leaves them with a rather crude lumping of East European political 
economies. For instance, while the Baltic states are distinguished by markedly higher state capacity 
than those of South-East Europe (World Bank, 2014), the Slovenian and the Visegrad economies are 
dominated by different types of economic actors, while their interest representation structures, or 
extent welfare provision, also vary.  
 
Putting the socio-political fabric at the centre of analysis, Bohle and Greskovits argued for the 
patterned evolution and consolidation of three distinct variants of capitalism in Central-Eastern 
Europe – a neo-liberal type in the Baltics, an embedded neo-liberal type in the Visegrad states and a 
neocorporatist type in Slovenia (Bohle & Greskovits, 2007). In what has been perhaps the most 
comprehensive work on comparative capitalism in CEE, the authors argued that what differentiates 
the specific variants is ‘the changing relative weight of the ideas and institutional implications of neo-
liberalism – which prioritizes the creation of efficient markets, welfare capitalism – which 
compensates for the costs of radical socio-economic change, and democratic corporatism – with its 
emphasis on institutional representation of social interests’ (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012: p.19). To 
operationalize these concepts, the different variants have become distinguished by their ‘deep, but 
variable integration into the neo-liberal global and European order, their tendency to pursue 
marketization and transformation cost compensation with different amounts of vigour and in varied 
forms, and different ways and varied effectiveness in which these conflicting and contested social 
objectives are governed’ (Ibid). A particular emphasis in the account is put on their fragility, as all have 
‘to manoeuvre within a space bordered by social disintegration, economic disorganisation and/or 
political breakdown – without coming dangerously close to any of these’ (Ibid: p.15). The political 
economies in CEE are thus conceived as constantly evolving, embodying inherent conflicts and 
contradictions, without either a clear end-point or the guarantee of success. 
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1.2 Towards a Social Contract in Central-Eastern Europe 
Based on the above literature and for the purposes of this article, the political economies in Central-
Eastern Europe are conceived as being based on a distinct two-dimensional social contract between 
the state and society. First, those economically active have been offered a path to economic 
prosperity. In newly reconfigured roles for the state and the market, robust economic growth, rising 
living standards, and new economic opportunities have defined the prospects for the productive parts 
of population. And second, social cohesion was secured by making specific provisions for the societies’ 
economically inactive or otherwise disadvantaged. Unable to reap the economic benefits of the new 
age, their acquiescence to the new order was achieved through different welfare arrangements. 
Inextricably linked, the underlying economic and social structures are subject to pressures from within 
and without and as a result, never fully settled, but continuously strengthened, challenged, or 
reshaped through the political sphere. It is this constant contestation of the economic and social 
spheres through the political process that is at the core of the social contract. The evolutionary 
dynamic of the CEE’s political economies predicts that periods of slow and incremental change are 
punctuated by deep crises, where economic prosperity and/or social cohesion appear jeopardized, 
putting the basic contours of the prevalent order under severe stress, potentially prompting significant 
changes in the underlying economic and social structures.  
 
The economic dimension of the social contract has been underpinned by distinct growth models. Each 
growth model has been (1) defined by deep, but varied form of international economic integration, 
(2) underpinned by different leading industry sectors (3) and driven by actors of varied nature and 
origin. The ‘classic phase’ of these growth models, when their ‘features became the most pronounced, 
was the 2000-2007 period, coinciding with a global economic boom and with the anticipation and then 
realization of… becoming full EU members’ (Marer, 2013: p.243). With the perils of transition over, 
spectacular growth rates, rising living standards and falling unemployment rates gripped the region. 
The second, social dimension has been underpinned by different dominant ideas about the 
appropriate role of the state in compensating those unable to take advantage of the new economic 
opportunities. Although some have called for a more ‘substantive understanding of compensation 
that focuses on its role in mitigating even more fundamental anxieties that those stemming from 
declining ‘objective’ standard of material wellbeing’ (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012: p.50), because of the 
difficulty of operationalizing such variable, compensation is understood in its material sense and refers 
to pensions, social and unemployment insurance, along with public services such as healthcare and 
education. And drawing on Bohle & Greskovits (2012), three distinct social contracts that have 
emerged in CEE. 
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The populations in the Baltics have settled on a neo-liberal nationalist social contract (see Bohle & 
Greskovits, 2012: Ch.3). With their banking sectors overtaken by predominantly Scandinavian banking 
houses at the turn of the millennia and on the back of ‘abundant global liquidity’ (Mitra et al., 2010: 
p.15), Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have embarked on financialized growth characterized by booming 
non-tradable sectors. The foreign-owned banks offset construction and real-estate booms unmatched 
in the developed world (Égert & Mihaljek, 2007) by offering what often were negative real interest 
rates on Euro-denominated consumer loans and mortgages (Bukeviciute & Kosicki, 2012). Their 
export-specialization in traditional light and heavy industries, such as food, textiles and wood and 
metal, and labour-intensive services have been unable to offset the domestic consumption booms, 
resulting in double digit trade and current account deficits and exploding external indebtedness (Bohle 
& Greskovits, 2012: p.40; IMF, 2014). The march to prosperity in the Baltics has thus been based on a 
rapid expansion of domestic demand, financed by cheap credit from abroad and accompanied by the 
gradual erosion of international competitiveness. The extension of credit has also offered an effective 
substitute for the relatively meagre provision of social compensation, the latter being determined by 
a preference for low flat-tax systems, stringent monetary arrangements and the marginalization of 
the Russian minorities as part of the ongoing nation-building projects (McNabb & King, 2014). 
Exemplified in the prominence of the politics of identity, the populations in the Baltics have accepted 
a minimal state, perceived as necessary to safeguard national identity and independence. 
 
The Visegrad populations have embraced a neo-liberal welfarist social contract (Bohle & Greskovits, 
2012: Ch. 4). Although their banking sectors have equally been overtaken by foreign actors, with the 
exception of Hungary, banks’ lending activities have been financed mainly by domestic deposits. 
However, benefiting from the outsourcing of multinationals, particularly from the automotive and 
electronics industries, all four have become firmly integrated in the global economy through what has 
been termed the German-Central European supply chain (IMF, 2013). And although located in 
relatively downstream activities of global production chains, the acquired technology, capital and 
know-how has underpinned the expansion and competitiveness of their exports. With ‘tiny positive 
or only small negative net exports contributions to growth’ (Marer, 2013: p.247) and safeguarding 
their labour unit costs, the march to prosperity in the Visegrad economies has been achieved through 
their penetration of global markets with complex manufacturing exports. To maintain social cohesion, 
the Visegrad states have institutionalized relatively generous social compensation, often targeting 
particular groups within society. Owing to the army of disability and early pensioners in Hungary and 
Poland respectively, the Visegrad states have been referred to as ‘pensioners’ democracies’ 
(Vanhuysse, 2006), prompting historical studies into the origins of these arrangements (Inglot, 2008). 
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A third, neo-corporatist social contract has consolidated in Slovenia (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012: Ch.5) 
in its core features closely resembling the democratic corporatist arrangements of Katzenstein’s small 
West European states. Slovenia’s growth model has been distinguished from that of the Visegrad 
states by its reliance on domestic economic actors, with the state retaining considerable foothold in 
the economy via extensive enterprise and bank ownership. Encouraging only highly selective forms of 
FDI to promote technological upgrading, Slovenia’s production profile came to resemble closely that 
of the Visegrad states, as it too penetrated global markets with complex manufacturing exports. Only 
as part of the EU-accession process did the FDI regime become fully liberalized, although foreign 
presence in key sectors, such as banking, has nevertheless remained minimal (EBRD, 2007: p.192). The 
strong institutional representation of social interests has translated into the region’s most generous 
welfare state in terms of both, public services and social transfers (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012: p.36). 
 
As observable in Table 1, the central point within the social contract framework is the capacity of the 
CEE political economies to economically deliver for their populations, while making specific provisions 
for the vulnerable or less fortunate in society.  
 
Table 1 – Prosperity & Social Cohesion in CEE 
 Real GDP 
growth rate, 
2000-2007 
averages (%) 
GDP per 
capita in 2007 
(% of EU28, 
PPP) 
Unemployment 
rate in 2007 (%) 
Total social 
expenditure 
2000-2007 
(% of GDP) 
Social 
benefits per 
capita ‘00-‘07 
(EUR, PPP) 
Baltics 7.9 63         (+22.7)  5               (-10.1)  13.7 1,331 
Visegrad 4 4.5 66.4      (+10.6) 8.4              (-4.1) 19.7 2,371 
Slovenia 4.4 88.2        (+8.2) 4.9             (-1.8) 23.8 4,021 
Source: Bohle & Greskovits (2012: p.35) & Eurostat. Data in parentheses indicate % change from 2000.  
 
The Baltic, Visegrad and Slovenian political economies represent the principal growth models and 
social compensation mechanisms that have consolidated in the CEE region. Moreover, their similar 
levels of per-capita income, state and administrative capacity and joint integration into the Euro-
Atlantic economic and political structures, which although reinforcing their institutional capacities 
(Bruzst & McDermott, 2012) also constraint their range of policy instruments, render this group of 
countries suitable for a comparative analysis of the sort undertaken in this article. In this respect, while 
the Balkan political economies can be argued to have been underpinned by Baltic-style growth models 
and similarly low levels of material compensation (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012), their lower per-capita 
incomes, distinctively weaker state capacities, and delayed or incomplete integration into the Euro-
Atlantic structures likely render their unqualified comparison with the former group unwarranted.  
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2. Hypothesizing Adjustment 
Within the social contract framework, an economic crisis of the proportions recently witnessed may 
bear profound implications for the continued prosperity of the populations, while the accompanying 
fiscal stress poses a dilemma over the distribution of the accompanying costs. This section speculates 
on how these essential economic and social processes are likely to have evolved.  
2.1 Hypothesizing Economic Adjustment 
Revealing the weaknesses of the particular growth models, the crisis has been imported via two 
dominant transmission channels – financial and trade channel (EBRD, 2009; Drahokoupil & Myant, 
2011). The financial channel has been dominant in the Baltics, their growth model being characterized 
by the build-up of significant external imbalances, their consumption booms financed by quickly 
reversible capital inflows (Grønn & Fredholm, 2013), rendering them thoroughly dependent on the 
change of foreign financial sentiment. External imbalances in Slovenia and the Visegrad states have 
not reached critical levels, although Hungary came close (Table 2.1). 
 
Table 2.1 – Financial Exposure 
 Current 
account 
Balance in 
2007 (% of 
GDP) 
Ratio of 
External Debt 
to Exports in 
2008 (%) 
Credit to 
private sector 
in March 2007 
(% of GDP) 
Loans in 
foreign 
currency in 
2008 (% of 
total) 
Mortgage 
lending to 
households in 
2007 (% of GDP)  
Baltics -18.4 187.7 256.7 79.5 29.5 
Visegrad 4 -5.4 113.2a 176.5 33.5b 10.2c 
Slovenia -6.2 147.6 190.8 – 6.2 
Source: Various sources quoted from Drahokoupil & Myant (2011), Bohle & Greskovits (2012: p.225) EBRD Transition Reports 
(2007, 2009) 
a) Data for Czech Republic missing 
b) In Hungary, the share stood at 63.8% 
c) Data for Czech Republic from 2006 
 
Integrated into the global economy through participating in MNC’s manufacturing production chains, 
the Visegrad states have imported the crisis via the trade channel, as foreign demand for their 
products collapsed. And despite not being dominated by foreign MNCs – although reliant on foreign 
input into niche industries – Slovenia’s integration into the global economy via complex manufacturing 
exports implied that it too was adversely impacted by the collapse in trade. Owing to their 
participation in buyer-driven networks, the Baltics have also been hard hit by declines in trade, 
although on the back of an overall lower share of exports in GDP (Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.2 – Trade Exposure 
 Exports in 2008 
(% of GDP) 
Share of complex 
manufacturing 
exports in total 
exports, 2008 (%)b 
Share of domestic 
value added in 
total exports in 
2008 (%) 
Change in Exports 
Q1 2009 y-o-y (%) 
Baltics 44 33 65 -25.5 
Visegrad 4 61.4a 62 56.8 -16.8c 
Slovenia 53.7 56 58.8 -22.4 
Source: Various sources quoted from Drahokoupil & Myant (2011), Bohle & Greskovits (2012: p.45) Stehrer (2013) 
a) Average for CZE, HUN, SVK (V3) at 70.6 
b) SITC Classification 5 and 7. 
b) Average for V3 at -21.5 
The extent of external imbalances and derived vulnerabilities of the different growth models arguably 
act as strong indicators for delivering prosperity post-2008/9. The reversal of international capital 
flows, bursting of asset bubbles and the accompanying economic distress, along with the limited 
production capacities and low integration into the global value chains (OECD, 2013a), brought the 
Baltic economies ‘to what appeared to be a possibly terminal crisis’ (Drahokoupil & Myant, 2011: 
p.212). Indeed, there is little evidence that financialized growth ‘benefits long-term growth in 
emerging markets’ (EBRD, 2009; p.62). The smaller dependence of Visegrad states and Slovenia on 
foreign finance together with their export-oriented industrial bases means that they are likely to 
benefit from a global recovery and undergo a quick turnaround. According to this reasoning, the 
extent to which CEE political economies had become vulnerable ‘is the key to explaining differences 
in their growth performances… as well as growth prospects’ (Marer, 2013: p.246). Thus, while 
‘recovery from the depression may be easier for countries exporting modern manufactured goods… 
recovery may be extremely difficult for countries that depended on financialized growth’ (Drahokoupil 
& Myant, 2011: p.332). In this vein, the sustainability of the pre-crisis growth models is likely to be the 
best predictor of post-crisis economic performance 2009. This is referred to as the ‘economic legacy 
hypothesis.’ 
Notwithstanding the different growth models, all governments possess significant leeway in terms of 
policy instruments that may be decisive in restoring economic prosperity for their populations. 
Commenting on the CEE region, some have argued that ‘whether and at what cost various states have 
been able to manoeuvre through hard times has ultimately depended on the capacities of the political 
sphere, rather than merely on the specifics of crisis exposure’ (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012; p.224). And 
there exists considerable literature on the appropriate course of crisis management. A counter-cyclical 
stimulus is deemed crucial in boosting aggregate demand, offsetting the lack of private spending and 
preventing further declines in economic activity (Keynes, 1936; Baldacci et al., 2009). Historical 
experience clearly demonstrates ‘the critical role of an early, strong, and carefully thought out, fiscal 
response’ (Blanchard et al., 2008: p.12). Monetary policy should generally be accommodative to fiscal 
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expansion (IMF, 2009a: p.xii), while a currency devaluation is likely to provide a temporary boost to 
exports (Obstfeld, 2001; Rodrik, 2009; Haddad & Pancaro, 2010). Ultimately, labour market policies 
(LMPs) can be decisive in improving the employment opportunities of displaced workers, where 
especially training programmes are associated with positive medium-term impacts (Card et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, the ideal anti-crisis policy-mix would thus include a sizeable fiscal stimulus to boost 
aggregate demand, monetary easing to promote exports, and scaling up of funding for LMPs to avoid 
permanent losses in employment. Countries whose governments were able to fully exploit these 
policy instruments are likely to outperform. This is referred to as ‘economic policy hypothesis.’  
It is important to note that the two factors underpinning post-crisis performance presented above 
may act in conjunction, so that countries that faced low exposure to the crisis and which pursued the 
right anti-crisis policies are the most likely to stand out. 
2.2 Hypothesizing Fiscal Adjustment 
The persistent fiscal deficits even during the boom years, the fallout from the crisis, and mounting 
pressure from the EU have put the consolidation of public finances high on the CEE government’s 
agenda. The OECD defines fiscal consolidation as ‘concrete policies aimed at reducing government 
deficits and debt accumulation’ (OECD, 2011a: p.17). As the governments always face a choice and 
can draw on a multitude of instruments to achieve that end, the crisis has ‘set in motion unusually 
fierce domestic distributional struggles’ (Bohle & Greskovits, 2009; p.61) over who will bear the brunt 
of the costs. Depending on which measures the governments pursue (Table 2.3), these can be either 
progressive, where the costs are mainly borne by capital, high-income earners and wealthy 
individuals, or regressive, where the brunt of the adjustment is handed onto the more vulnerable parts 
of society, such as low-income households and dependants on social programmes. The chosen course 
bears profound implications for income and wealth inequality.  
Table 2.3 – Instruments of Fiscal Consolidation 
Expenditure Cuts Revenue Increases 
Public consumption: education Personal income taxes  
Public consumption: health Social security contributions 
Public consumption: other (except family) Corporate income taxes  
Cash transfers: pensions Environmental taxes 
Cash transfers: unemployment benefits Consumption taxes (non-environmental) 
Cash transfers: sickness and disability Recurrent taxes on immovable property  
Public consumption and cash transfers: family Other property taxes 
Subsidies Sales of goods and services 
Public investment  
Source: Adapted from Goujard et al. (2013: p.18) 
It is likely that the greater the threat of severe social dislocation, the stronger the pressure on 
governments to pursue a more progressive course of adjustment, extend social safety nets and thus 
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cushion the blow for the most vulnerable ones. The crisis may thus prove to be the functional 
equivalent of the horrors of the 1930s (Katzenstein, 1985: Ch.3) and in countries undergoing severe 
economic stress induce a shift towards more socially responsible states (Lauristin & Vihalemm, 2010). 
This is particularly relevant for the Baltics, as their ‘search for an alternative economic model may also 
involve additional welfare adjustments’ (Drahokoupil & Myant, 2011: p.212). Other arguments could 
be the diminishing capacity of the politics of identity in the Baltics to elicit public support for painful 
adjustments (Bohle & Greskovits, 2012: p.258), or the strong emphasis placed on the most vulnerable 
segments of society by international public lenders (Schrader, 2008; Burke, 2010). On the other hand, 
the generous Visegrad and Slovenian welfare states have been confronted by a need ‘to adjust to the 
emerging post-crisis context of permanent austerity’ (Bohle & Grekovits, 2012; p.248). As the crisis 
exasperated the funding gaps of their generous social programs and transfers, these have been put 
‘clearly under threat’ (Drahokoupil & Myant, 2011: p.212) and their likely scaling down spells out a 
more regressive course of fiscal adjustment. Thus, the Baltics are likely to purse a more progressive, 
while Visegrad four and Slovenia a more regressive course of fiscal adjustment. This is referred to as 
the ‘transformative hypothesis.’ 
 
On the other hand, the institutionalization of generous welfare states creates powerful constituents 
in societies that are fundamentally opposed to welfare retrenchment (Esping-Andersen, 1990), 
potentially making the welfare state irreversible (Theobroen & Roebroek, 1986). In this vein, 
Slovenia’s extensive welfare state, together with its advanced institutionalization of interest 
representation, may prove resistant to significant scaling back. And whether perceived as products of 
long historical legacies (Inglot, 2008) or instrumental divide and pacify calculus on behalf of early 
reformers (Vanhuysse, 2006), the Visegrad states’ generous welfare provisions for specific segments 
of society have likely induced a ‘ratchet effect’ (Huber & Stephens, 2001: p.28) with social policies 
creating their political constituencies ‘reproducing popular expectations that the state would provide 
social protection’ (Drahokoupil & Myant, 2011: p.192), making reversals politically unfeasible. As both 
the strong political representation of social interests or generous welfare regimes never 
institutionalized in the Baltics, there is less scope for regressive measures to encounter resistance, 
while a continuation of past policies would predict the emphasis in adjustment being put on 
competitiveness, rather than equity. According to this reasoning, Slovenia and the Visegrad states are 
likely to pursue more progressive and the Baltics more regressive fiscal adjustment strategies. This is 
referred to as the ‘path-dependence hypothesis.’ 
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3. Data, Methodology and Evaluation 
This section presents the data sources and methods deployed in constructing and evaluating the 
comparative economic performance and the fiscal adjustment strategies.  
3.1 Economic Adjustment 
The data on the composition of GDP, developments in foreign trade and changes in the labour market 
has been obtained from national statistical offices and Eurostat and is presented in Appendix I. Data 
on fiscal and monetary policies was gathered from a range of secondary sources, most prominently 
international organisations and academic articles, while data on labour market policies from Eurostat. 
The detailed composition of a fiscal stimulus – whether it is aimed at consumers, firms, or consists of 
increased spending on goods and services (Blanchard et al., 2008) – is not explored in detail, based on 
the assumption that any approved fiscal stimulus will tend to be tailored to specific domestic needs, 
and combine all dimensions. With monetary policy, a sizeable depreciation of currency against the 
world reserve currencies is understood to constitute stimulus. Contrary to most studies, labour market 
activation measures are treated as economic policies based on the overall categorization of 
employment as an essentially economic, rather than a social goal.  
 
To analyse the determinants of economic performance, the conventional approach taken by 
economists would be to subject the relationship between a dependent and a set of independent 
variables to econometric analysis and measure their explanatory power and statistical significance. 
Popular for identifying the determinants of FDI (Sridharan et al., 2010; Özkan-Günay, 2011; 
Kudriavceva, 2011), or determining the causes behind the depth of a recession (Conolly, 2012), 
regression analysis could be argued to provide a sensible approach to determinants of post-crisis 
economic performance. However, owing to the relatively short period under study, small number of 
countries and the multi-variable conception of economic performance, this article incorporates the 
quantitative findings into a qualitative approach. Overall economic performance is derived from the 
changes in and composition of GDP using the expenditure method, to reveal the macro-drivers of 
growth; developments in foreign trade, with a particular focus on the structure of exports, for 
structural shifts; and changes in labour force and employment across sectors, indicating the economic 
opportunities of respective populations.  
 
Economic performance is assessed based on the values that the three variables assume, where data 
for 2013 are contrasted with pre-crisis levels. These are the criteria: 
 A higher level of economic activity (GDP) is preferred to a lower one, as it implies more spending 
opportunities for consumers. 
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 Private sector-led growth is preferable to a public sector-led one, as numerous studies point to 
its superiority in achieving long-term growth (Ghali, 2003; Milbourne et al, 2003). 
 Positive trade balance is preferable to a negative one, as the former diminishes vulnerability to 
capital flow reversals and is particularly relevant for emerging economies (Llaudes et al., 2010). 
 Higher share of export growth accounted for by products of complex manufacturing industries 
(Combined Nomenclature VI, XVI, XVII, XVIII)1 is considered preferable to a lower one, as it 
indicates greater technological upgrading of production profiles. 
 Lower loss in employment is preferable to a higher one, as the former indicates more adequate 
skillsets of the workforce and greater utilization of the labour stock. 
 More equal employment across the population is preferable to a highly skewed one towards any 
particular group, as the former indicates greater equality of opportunity. 
3.2 Fiscal Adjustment 
For each country, instruments deployed in fiscal adjustment have been identified with the basic 
revenue-side versus expenditure-side dichotomy maintained. Data on changes in statutory tax rates 
can be readily obtained from large accounting firms, such as KPMG, supplemented by the OECD’s and 
EU Commission’s qualitative and quantitative online tax-databases. Qualitative data on the changes 
in social spending categories was obtained from a range of sources, most prominently the periodic 
OECD country surveys, European Commission’s Convergence reports, and previous academic studies. 
Only measures with clear distributional impacts (Table 3.1) are included in the calculation of the final 
score and are presented in Appendix 2.  
Table 3.1 – Instruments of Fiscal Adjustment with Clear Distributional Impacts 
Revenue-side Measures Expenditure-side measures 
Corporate income taxes Public consumption: education  
Personal income taxes  Public consumption: healthcare 
Social security contributions Cash transfers: pensions & disability benefits 
Consumption taxes  Cash transfers: unemployment benefits 
Recurrent taxes on immovable property and 
wealth taxes 
Public consumption and cash transfers: family 
Source: Goujard et al. (2013), Angello & Sousa (2012) 
 
No distinction is made between temporary and permanent changes, as the former often represents 
merely a sell strategy for unpopular measures. Similarly, no attempt is made to distinguish between 
clear-cut anti-crisis measures and continuity with past policies, as the two are ‘very difficult to 
separate out’ (Drahokoupil et al., 2013: p.387) and the difference is largely irrelevant for a broader 
analysis of fiscal adjustment undertaken in this article. Significant measures with no clear-cut 
distributional impacts are presented, though have no impact on the final score. Consistent with 
Goujard et al. (2013), changes in public fixed investment is not captured by the indicator, and to avoid 
                                                          
1 VI. Products of chemicals & allied industries; XVI. Machinery & mechanical appliances, electrical equipment; 
XVII. Vehicles and associated equipment; XVIII. Optical, medical and measuring instruments, watches  
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possible controversy, neither are changes in subsidies or sales of public assets. While some deem the 
phasing out of subsidies as progressive (Goujard et al., 2013: p.78), others perceive their persistence 
a ‘manifestation of the principle of social protection’ (Bohle & Greskovits, 2007: p.445). Sales of public 
assets are not assigned a score, as the benefits of increasing the efficiency, and often phasing out of 
transfers to loss-making enterprises, likely come at the expense of loss of employment and thus 
subject to a similar dilemma as subsidies. Ultimately, cuts in the salaries and employment levels in the 
public sector are not assigned a score, based on the observation that these tended to increase 
substantially during the 2000s, and not subject to market pressures, have no other way of re-aligning 
to post-crisis realities. 
 
Changes in public spending and tax rates were categorized according to their distributional impacts 
and assigned a score. Owing to a lack of up-to-date data from the widely used Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database (SWIID), the small number of countries considered and relatively short 
period under scrutiny, quantifying the actual impact of measures deployed is not feasible. However, 
the few previous studies on the distributional impacts of fiscal consolidation strategies reach 
remarkable consensus on the impacts of different instruments on income and wealth inequality 
(Angello & Sousa, 2012; Woo et al., 2013; Ball et al., 2013) and these have provided the basis for 
assigning scores. In the absence of sound alternatives, a composite indicator is constructed capturing 
the nature of the fiscal adjustment, ranging from +3, indicating an overall very progressive, to -3, 
representing a very regressive one. All fiscal measures have equal weight, unchanged tax rates or 
spending categories are not assigned a score, while overall mild or counter-balanced changes may 
result in the addition or subtraction of half points. Although the exercise is evidence-based, a clear 
element of judgement is involved. However, the major advantage of the indicator is that it captures 
changes beyond mere deficit and debt reduction and is thus better indicative of the broader fiscal 
adjustment. Relying on the summary of relevant literature as laid out in Goujard et al. (2013: p.76-80), 
these have been the criteria when assigning the scores: 
 While across-the-board cuts to public services or social benefits are deemed regressive, 
improving the targeting of transfers to families is deemed progressive. 
 Loosening eligibility criteria, increasing replacement rates and extending duration of 
unemployment benefits are deemed progressive, while the opposite is deemed regressive.  
 Increases in the retirement age,2 lowering the indexation formula, measures to restrict eligibility 
for or lowering nominal effective pensions are deemed regressive, and the opposite progressive. 
                                                          
2 While Goujard et al. consider increasing the statutory pension age progressive, on the basis that ‘people who 
would otherwise have retired and drawn a sometimes low pension will keep on drawing a higher salary’ (Goujard 
et al., 2013: p.77), this is not the assumption made here, owing to the special role that pension regimes have 
assumed in mitigating poverty in some CEE states and the uncertainty over avoiding workfare-style employment 
during economic downturns, particularly for the elderly.  
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 Increasing corporate income taxes and statutory personal income tax rates for high-income 
earners are deemed progressive, while decreasing them regressive. 
 Increasing consumption taxes and social security contributions are deemed regressive, while 
decreasing them progressive. 
 Increases / decreases of the statutory income tax rate in a flat rate system are judged on the basis 
of the changes in the labour tax wedge for different income groups and, to avoid double counting, 
are assigned a single score together with social security taxes.  
 Increased taxation of wealth and property based on its market value is deemed progressive, while 
a decrease or abolishing of such taxes regressive. 
3.3 Limitations of the Methodology 
A qualitative approach to assess economic performance loses the statistical significance and certainty 
offered by econometric methods and is thus more speculative in nature. When analysing fiscal 
adjustment strategies, as noted, assigning values requires an element of judgement, which diminishes 
the reliability of generated data. To remedy these in future studies, statistical methods can be applied 
by expanding the number of countries and possibly the range of explanatory variables, assuming 
availability of relevant data. On the other hand, model specifications will inevitably require an element 
of subjective judgement, while the greater detail afforded by a qualitative approach will be lost. 
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4. Economic Adjustment 
This section lays out how EU’s diverse Eastern bloc of countries has withered the economic storm. To 
maintain consistence, economic policies are presented with economic performance by country group. 
A categorization of the findings is then provided. 
4.1 The Baltics 
The reversal of capital flows has translated into abrupt and severe declines in economic activity in the 
over-heated Baltic economies. The cumulative output loss between the peak and the trough for the 
three countries ranged between Lithuania’s 15% to Latvia’s 22% (Figure 4.1), the largest in the world. 
This has put the Baltic governments in an uneasy position, as the collapse in economic activity implied 
dramatically falling budget revenues and given the uncertainty over the willingness of international 
investors to finance sizeable fiscal expansion, reigning in deficits took primacy over the pursuit of a 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy (Purfield & Rosenberg, 2010). Another challenge was the widespread 
Euroization of the Baltic economies, a cause of concern not least for the Nordic banks, the subsidiaries 
of which funded the pre-crisis booms. Uncertainty over the scope of bankruptcies following a currency 
devaluation, which would likely serve to aggravate the already dire economic situation, resulted in the 
governments’ decision not to unwind the currency pegs. Even the Latvian government, in 2009 
agreeing to a rescue package from international public lenders totalling over 40% of the country’s GDP 
(IMF, 2009b), has shunned the option of widening the Euro-Lat currency band, despite it being 
contemplated by the IMF. Thus a mix of domestic 
concerns over the governments’ funding 
capacities, fears over the economy-wide 
deterioration of balance sheets, together with the 
interests of the international financial 
community, resulted in the chosen strategy being 
to regain competitiveness through internal 
devaluation – a reduction in the price and wage 
level in the economy (Purfield & Rosenberg, 2010; 
Kattel & Raudla, 2013a). 
 
Two outcomes stand out from the course of macro-adjustment in the Baltics. The first is the sheer 
extent of volatility of fixed investment. After a collapse of, on average, almost 40% between 2008 and 
2009, it has undergone significant expansion starting in mid-to-late 2010, heralding a turnaround in 
economic activity. However, this momentum has lost steam with what seemed like an imminent 
break-up of the Eurozone in the summer of 2012. Since then, its contribution to growth became mixed 
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and its overall share in GDP stagnating. On the other hand, owing to successful tapping into EU funds, 
public investment has remained robust (Figure 4.2, Box 5.1). Second, after 2009, the contribution of 
net exports to growth has been minimal, and often negative. Although exports as a share of GDP have 
increased significantly (Figure 4.3) and the countries’ current accounts have undergone significant re-
balancing, calling the Baltic recovery ‘export-led’ (IMF, 2014) would be misleading. It was recovering 
domestic demand – fixed investment in particular – that contributed to the bulk of post-crisis growth. 
 
A more detailed look at the trade balance reveals 
that while it shifted from, on average, a negative 
14.7% of GDP in 2007 to slightly below zero in 
2013, all three countries continue to rely on their 
surpluses in services trade, averaging around 5% 
of GDP, in offsetting the persistent deficits in 
trade in goods. On the other hand, the latter have 
declined by more than two thirds, from an 
average of over 18% of GDP in 2007 to under 6% 
in 2013 (Figure 4.4).  In Latvia and Lithuania a fifth 
of total export growth was accounted for by food, beverage and tobacco products. In the former, 
electrical equipment and machinery alone contributed by another fifth, while in Lithuania, products 
of complex manufacturing industries and mineral products each accounted for around 18%. The 
pattern is significantly different for Estonia, where almost half of total export growth has been 
accounted for by products of complex manufacturing industries, while only 10% by products of food, 
beverage and tobacco industries and even less by mineral products (Figure 4.5). Thus while the bulk 
of exports growth from Latvia and Lithuania owed to products of food, beverage, tobacco industries 
and minerals, the technological sophistication of Estonia’s exports has markedly improved. The 
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successful penetration of world markets by these possibly heralds the emergence of new leading 
industries in the Baltics, substituting for the gap left by the explosion of non-tradable sectors. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, the swift Baltic economic rebalancing has taken a heavy toll in the labour market. 
Although the initial response of the governments was to increase spending on LMPs, on average it 
never surpassed 0.25% of GDP, with roughly half of the funds devoted to training. However, both the 
overall LMP spending and spending on training have followed a declining trend. Participation in LMPs 
has remained particularly very weak, at its peak just 7% of those looking for work (Figure 4.6). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After a spike from an average of 5% in 2007 to a peak of 18% in 2010, the total unemployment rate 
still remains in double digits in Latvia and Lithuania, with long-term unemployment following a similar 
trend (Figure 4.7). However, the fall in the unemployment rate owes not so much to job creation, as 
to the decline in total labour force, which varied from under 2.5% in Estonia to over 10% in Latvia. And 
despite the pick-up in economic activity and job creation from 2011, total labour force continues to 
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decline in all three countries (Figure 4.8). Reflecting the shift away from non-tradable sectors, the 
most severe declines in employment have been in construction, decreasing by an average of almost 
40% and by almost 50% in Latvia. The already low level of employment in manufacturing prior to the 
crisis decreased by over a sixth and by 2013 its share in total employment declined to 16%. On the 
other hand, employment in knowledge-intensive services – IT and finance and insurance in particular 
– has been preserved or even expanded (Eurostat, 2014). The labour shedding thus appears to have 
hit the lower-skilled workers particularly hard, while opportunities for their skill upgrading have 
remained severely limited.  
 
 4.2 The Visegrad Four 
When confronted by the first signs of an economic downturn, the Visegrad governments have not 
found themselves as constrained as their Baltic counterparts. However, this was not the case in 
Hungary, which already in 2008 required international assistance totalling 17% of GDP (IMF, 2009b). 
As Hungary’s funding capacity was severely limited and its IMF programme focused mainly on reducing 
debt (IMF, 2008), its fiscal policy remained pro-cyclical. In the remaining three, collapsing exports and 
domestic demand prompted the implementation of mild fiscal stimulus packages. A stimulus ‘of 
around 2% of GDP’ was planned by Czech authorities (OECD, 2014a: p.13), though some of the 
measures were ‘already decided and approved’ before the crisis ‘so that so that the new fiscal 
stimulus… amounted to only 1.1% of GDP’ (Drahokoupil et al., 2013: p. 394). Poland’s 2009 anti-crisis 
package of 0.7% of GDP (OECD, 2010a: p.34), represented an ‘immediate relief rather than a significant 
economic stimulus’ (Drahokoupil et al., 2013: p. 398). The Slovak government has by February 2009 
adopted ‘62 explicit anti-crisis measures’ (Drahokoupil et al., 2013: p.399) with the total implemented 
stimulus package amounting to 1.4% of GDP (OECD, 2010b: p.29). Moreover, successive rounds of 
monetary easing in Poland resulted in a devaluation of Zloty against the Euro by 34% to trough, 
securing it ‘the mildest decrease in export volumes from among CE4’ (OECD, 2010a: p.27). The Czech 
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and Hungarian currencies depreciated by 10% and 20% respectively (OECD, 2011b; Drahokoupil & 
Myant, 2011: p.317). Slovakia, which adopted the Euro in January 2009, did so with ‘an exchange rate 
which turned out to be overvalued in the face of the crisis’ (Fidrmuc et al., 2013: p.17) and thus likely 
found itself at an initial disadvantage to its regional peers.  
 
The depth of economic recession varied across the Visegrad countries, ranging, from a slump of almost 
7% in Hungary, to uninterrupted growth Poland with important variation in the later revivals of 
economic activity (Figure 4.9). The overall economic adjustment can be divided into three stages. First, 
in 2009 the initial fiscal stimulus measures in Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland, together with net 
exports, partially offset the decline in fixed investment. In Hungary, only net exports have remained 
positive, resulting in the deepest slump. In the second stage, as of 2010, domestic demand rebounded 
with net exports representing a drag on growth. For the three smaller countries, the third stage, 
beginning in late 2011, is in direct contrast to the Baltic recovery, as domestic demand collapsed again 
with positive contributions to growth only from foreign trade, though substantial enough to prevent 
a slide back into recession only in Slovakia. Poland’ domestic demand remained robust until mid-2012, 
significantly aided by the EU co-funded extensive public investment linked to the 2012 European 
Football Championship. However, despite not having experienced the Baltic-style build-up of asset 
bubbles in non-tradables prior to the crisis, all Visegrad states are facing a continuous decline in 
private fixed investment (Figure 4.10), implying a significant diminishing of their potential output. 
 
The outcome is that between 2008 and 2013 exports have significantly increased their share in GDP 
in all four countries with Slovakia in fact recording the largest increase (Figure 4.11). While all 
economies, apart from Czech Republic, were running trade deficits in the 2000s, by 2013 they were 
recording record surpluses, ranging from 2.4% of GDP in Poland to 8% of GDP in Hungary. With 
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surpluses in services trade increasing only slightly, the major shift occurred in merchandise trade, the 
balance moving from minus 2 to a surplus of 4% of GDP between 2008 and 2013 (Figure 4.12).  
 
In Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, products of complex manufacturing industries accounted 
for 73%, 59% and 43% respectively of the increase in total exports. Expressed in current prices, 
Slovakia has recorded an almost 50% increase in the exports of vehicles and transport equipment, 
with notable increases across all CM categories in Czech Republic and Hungary. Also representing the 
largest category in Poland, products of complex manufacturing industries accounted for a third of 
export growth, with food, drink and tobacco products accounting for just under 15% (Figure 4.13). 
Thus, the evidence from the three smaller countries, and to some extent in Poland, suggests that the 
foreign-owned manufacturing plants have retained their strategic roles and have accounted for the 
bulk of export growth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The recoveries in the Visegrad states have been export-led, but jobless. The governments have scaled 
up funding for LMPs, peaking at just over 0.4% of GDP in 2010 with around a fifth of those looking for 
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work participating, significantly more than in the Baltics. However, very little of the LMP funding goes 
towards training with an overall greater preference of governments for employment incentives or 
direct job creation (Figure 4.14). The latter is particularly prominent in Hungary, where the 
government has launched numerous rounds of public works, by 2012 employing more than 200,000 
people. This is despite empirical evidence for Hungary showing that ‘various public works schemes 
experimented in the past have failed to improve the employability of participants and to provide a 
foothold in the open labour market’ (Budapest Institute, 2011: quoted from OECD, 2012a: p.91).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The boost from LMPs notwithstanding, the total unemployment rate has increased significantly across 
Visegrad states, moving sideways or further increasing as time progresses (Figure 4.15), remaining in 
double digits in all apart from the Czech Republic. However, the overall labour force has grown, and 
together with the overall weakness of private sector job creation, plays a role in the persistence of 
high unemployment (Figure 4.16). In terms of industry sectors, the decrease in the number of people 
working in construction has been much milder than in the Baltics, ranging from 20% in Hungary to 
under 5% in Poland. Despite an overall decline of employment in manufacturing, jobs in the export  
Source: National Statistical Offices Source: Eurostat 
Source: Eurostat (Data from 2012 for Slovakia & Hungary only) 
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oriented automotive and electrical industries have been preserved, or even slightly increased. And 
similar to the Baltics, there has been an expansion in the total number of people employed in 
knowledge-intensive service industries (Eurostat, 2014). Thus, while the employment premium for 
highly-skilled and those working in the export-oriented foreign industries has increased, the evidence 
suggests that large parts of the populations have been unable to join then in their success. 
4.3 Slovenia 
By 2010, Slovenia implemented the most extensive Keynesian style, demand-stimulating fiscal 
stimulus out of the CEE countries, amounting to over 2% of GDP (IMF, 2011: p.4). On the other hand, 
having joined the Euro in 2007, Slovenia, like Slovakia, could not devalue its currency at the onset of 
the crisis and detrimental to its competitiveness were a series of minimum wage hikes, by 23% in 2010 
alone (EBRD, 2010; p.145). In later stages, Slovenia has been engulfed by ‘a severe banking crisis’ 
(OECD, 2013b: p.8), although the country has avoided an international bail-out.    
 
Having declined by almost 8% in 2009, the level of economic activity has been slowly recovering until 
early 2011, when the economy slid back into a recession, in which it has remained since (Figure 4.17). 
The decomposition of GDP reveals that between the last quarter of 2008 until the latter half of 2013 
Slovenia experienced the most protracted decreases in fixed investment out of all eight countries, 
severely diminishing its future growth potential (Figure 4.18) and since early 2011, the only positive 
contribution to growth has come from foreign trade. In the last quarter of 2013, the trend has been 
somewhat reversed, with fixed investment marking the first year-on-year increase in five years and 
net exports turning slightly negative. After what had together been fourteen quarters of negative real 
GDP growth since late 2008, growth in overall economic activity turned positive, possibly signalling a 
much needed turnaround.  
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Although net exports have constituted the only 
positive contribution to growth throughout the 
protracted recession, the performance of the 
export sector has been disappointing. While the 
overall trade balance improved between 2008 
and 2013 from negative 2% to positive 6% GDP 
(Figure 4.19), this largely owes to the collapse in 
imports, rather than a rise in exports. Expressed 
in current prices, exports of goods have increased 
by 7.5%, while imports fell by almost 10% with 
exports of services up by 10% and imports down by 3%. Particularly surprising is the weak performance 
of the export-oriented complex manufacturing sector with declines in the exports of machinery, 
electrical equipment and vehicles in terms of volumes and prices, though it has been partially offset 
by the almost 40% increase in exports of chemicals. Also preventing a deeper slump was the more 
than 150% increase in the exports mineral products. However, the leading domestic exporters from 
complex manufacturing industries have clearly lost market shares to their Visegrad peers (Figure 4.20). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite the unfavourable developments in the wider economy, the amount of support received by 
jobseekers in Slovenia, initially on a par with the Visegrad states, has been decreasing over time and 
of these funds, under a third tends to be allocated to training. The withering spending on LMPs over 
time has also translated to declining participation, as out of 100 people looking for work, less than 10 
have taken part in 2012, down from 35 in 2009 (Figure 4.21).  
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Slovenia’s unemployment rate has been on a steady rise, reaching double digits by 2013, up from 4.4% 
in 2008, with long-term unemployment following the same trend (Figure 4.22). The total labour force 
has been gradually shrinking, marking a 3% decrease by 2013 (Figure 4.23), although significantly 
milder than the average decline in the Baltics during the same period. The total loss of employment 
in construction stood at 20%, putting Slovenia between the Visegrad and Baltic states. Unlike in the 
Visegrad states, and mirroring the under-performance of the sector, the number of people employed 
in complex manufacturing declined by over 22%, with a similar decline in overall manufacturing, 
representing the greatest decline of all eight states (Eurostat, 2014). On the other hand, just as in the 
Baltics and Visegrad states, jobs in the knowledge-intensive services sector have somewhat expanded, 
as the crisis appears to have adversely impacted particularly the lower-to-medium skilled workers. 
 
4.4 Economic Adjustment: Categorization  
Table 4.1 summarizes the policy responses of CEE governments. The Baltic governments went against 
the conventional wisdom, pursuing no explicit fiscal stimulus, defending their currency pegs and 
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scaling up LMPs only moderately. The Visegrad governments have implemented mild counter-cyclical 
fiscal policies, significantly devalued their currencies (except Slovakia) and outspent the others on 
LMPs. Having implemented the most extensive fiscal stimulus package, Slovenia was unable to 
devalue its currency, and its LMP spending has been declining from a relatively high initial rate.  
Table 4.1 – Policy Responses 
 Fiscal Stimulus Monetary Stimulus LMPs 
Baltics   x 
Visegrad 4 x xx xx 
Slovenia xx  x 
Source: Author’s analysis 
 
As is evident from Table 4.2, no particular country, or country group, has clearly outperformed across 
all economic indicators. In terms of individual countries, Poland emerged superior in its unhindered 
growth of economic activity, although its share of private fixed investment in total GDP has declined 
to the second lowest figure in CEE. And despite the positive developments in Poland’s overall trade 
performance, the share of complex manufacturing products in total exports in fact declined. The Baltic 
economies have undergone significant re-balancing and expanded exports, though their export 
sophistication offers a mixed picture with Estonia clearly ahead of Latvia and Lithuania, while all three 
have yet to reach pre-crisis levels of economic activity. In the smaller Visegrad states, the fragile 
recoveries have been export-led with domestic demand – private investment in particular – recording 
significant declines, even relative to the overall lower levels of economic activity in Hungary and Czech 
Republic. Perhaps most striking is the absolute implosion of Slovenia across all economic indicators, 
as it recorded the most significant decline in economic activity, private fixed investment and a 
disappointing export performance, not captured by mere trade balance.  
Table 4.2 – Economic Outcomes 
 GDP in ‘13 
(% of pre-
crisis 
peak) 
Private Fixed 
Investment in 
’13 (% of GDP) 
Trade balance 
in  ’13 (% of 
GDP) 
Products of CM 
industries as % of 
total exports in ‘13 
Hidden 
unemployment 
rate in 2013a 
Estonia 97 21           (-9.5) 0.8            (+10) 31.3                 (+5.5) 11              (+6.4) 
Latvia 91 17.2      (-10.2) -1.9          (+18) 20.4                 (+0.9) 21            (+14.9) 
Lithuania 98 14.9        (-5.5) 1            (+14.3) 23                        (-3) 15.7        (+11.4) 
 
Poland 115 14.6        (-3.1) 2.4          (+5.3) 40.4                  (-2.4) 8.7             (+1.1) 
Czech rep. 97.5 19.3        (-2.9)    6.4          (+3.7) 53.8                 (+1.3) 7                (+2.6) 
Hungary 95 14.2        (-4.6) 8              (+7.5) 55                     (-3.9) 7.5              (-0.4)       
Slovakia 105 17           (-5.8) 6.3          (+8.7) 56.9                 (+4.2) 13.5           (+4.5) 
 
Slovenia 90.5 14.2         (-10) 6.7          (+9.2) 43.1                  (-1.1) 13              (+8.6) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eurostat & national statistical offices. Latest trade data for Poland from 
2012. Data in parentheses indicate change from pre-crisis level.  
a) Calculated by dividing the total number employed in 2013 over labour force in 2008.  
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The one dimension where all countries have underperformed is in employment and private sector job 
creation, although somewhat masked by the public works scheme in Hungary. As visible from Figure 
4.24, the crisis has clearly served to amplify the employment premium of education. There occurred 
a significant labour shedding of lower-to mid-qualified workers across all countries, with the highest 
average decline of almost 40% in the Baltics. On the other hand, the total number of employed highly 
educated workers increased in all groups, most significantly in the Visegrad four, especially those in 
their prime-years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat. Based on ISCED 2011. Low – primary and lower secondary (0-2); 
Medium – upper secondary and post-secondary, non-tertiary (3-4); High – short-
cycle tertiary, bachelor, masters or doctoral (5-8) 
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5. Fiscal Adjustment 
This section first lays out the data on the scope of fiscal consolidation undertaken and the evolution 
of public debt in each country. It then presents how the costs of consolidation were distributed within 
the broader fiscal adjustment. All findings are presented by country groups with the respective scores 
laid out at the end of the section.  
5.1 The Baltics 
As Figures 5.1 demonstrates, between 2009 and 2013 the Baltics have undertaken extensive fiscal 
consolidation measures, even by global historical standards (IMF, 2010: Ch.3), from over 17% in Latvia, 
to 12% of GDP in Estonia. By end 2013, the rapidly rising debt levels of Latvia and Lithuania appear to 
have stabilised with Estonia retaining one of the lowest in EU (Figure 5.2). 
 
 
5.1.1 Spending-side Fiscal Adjustment: Baltics 
Consistent with the economic strategy of internal devaluation, the Baltic governments had initially 
signalled an overwhelming preference for spending-side fiscal consolidation (Purfield & Rosenberg, 
2010: p.21). With respect to public consumption, public sector employment was reduced by between 
6.5% in Estonia to 20% in Latvia, and salaries of public officials were cut from 8% in Estonia to 20% in 
Latvia with higher ranking public officials faced a greater cut (Kattel & Raudla, 2013b: p.737). Spending 
on healthcare was slashed severely in all three countries with Lithuania and Latvia also squeezing 
budgets for education. Latvia instigated the most drastic cuts with ‘the education and health ministry 
budgets being reduced by one-half and one-third respectively’ (Purfield & Rosenberg, 2010: p.21).  
 
Concerning social transfers, statutory pension age was increased in all three countries, with the 
formula for pension indexation amended in Estonia to the extent that ‘the projected decline in the 
benefit ratio could pose a risk to the adequacy of pension entitlements’ (EC, 2013a: p.12). Latvia and 
Source: OECD, EU Commission, IMF. Note that 
Estonia’s figure also includes consolidation of almost 
2% of GDP at end 2008 (Kattel & Raudla, 2013b).  
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Lithuania implemented nominal cuts to pensions, although in the former, the constitutional court 
ruled the move unconstitutional and ordered the Latvian government to pay the difference until 2012 
(Purfield & Rosenberg, 2010: p.19). In Lithuania, the constitutional court ordered the government to 
compensate the pensioners for the cut, however, without specifying the scope or a timetable (EC, 
2012a). The generosity of unemployment benefits, for which only around a quarter of the unemployed 
have been eligible in each country, was cut in Latvia once above a certain threshold (Kattel & Raudla, 
2013b: p.737), their duration was reduced (Dovladbekova, 2012: p.3) and eligibility criteria further 
tightened in 2012 (EC, 2012b; p.14). In Estonia the planned extension of coverage to persons who lost 
employment by mutual agreement was abolished (OECD, 2011c: p.99). Family benefits in Estonia were 
left unchanged, though have a ‘regressive character, as the largest share goes to the top income 
quintile’ (Ibid: p.90-1). In Latvia, ‘childbirth allowances were cut by almost 35 per cent, child care and 
paternal benefits by 40 per cent and child care allowance for a child younger than 1 year by 38 per 
cent’ (Dovladbekova, 2012: p.3). In Lithuania, family benefits were cut by 10% in 2009 (Kattel & Raudla, 
2013: p.737) and maternity benefits slashed in 2012 (EC, 2013b: p.11) so that by 2013 the government 
‘has managed to retrench all universal family benefits’ (Aidukaite, 2013: p.96).   
 
5.1.2 Revenue-side Fiscal Adjustment: Baltics 
On the revenue side, corporate income taxes (CIT) and personal income taxes (PIT) have remained 
largely unchanged. Although increasing the CIT by 5% to 20% in 2009, Lithuanian government quickly 
reversed the move concerned that it would ‘aggravate the [economic] downturn and adversely impact 
mobile capital and labor tax bases, impair competitiveness, and deter investment’ (Purfield & 
Rosenberg, 2010; p.21). Lithuania’s PIT was lowered in 2009 by 3% to 21%, a rate which includes a 6% 
healthcare insurance tax, so that income from an unlimited civil liability company is ‘subjected to 15% 
personal income tax rate, in the case if taxable profits exceeds 4000LTL (1159EUR)’ (Gencs Walters, 
2011). The extensive debates on introducing progressive income taxation in Lithuanian parliament in 
2013 ‘have been inconclusive’ (EC, 2013b: p.10). Estonian governments remained committed to 
keeping both statutory CIT and PIT rates constant at 21% throughout adjustment with plans to lower 
both by 1% in 2015 (KPMG, 2014), while keeping reinvested corporate income untaxed. Latvia’s single 
personal income tax bracket was in 2010 increased from 23 to 26%, thought brought down in 2011 to 
25% with plans to gradually lower it to 20% (EC, 2013c: p.14). Corporate income taxes were kept stable 
at 15%.  
 
On the other hand, regressive revenue enhancements have been extensively used. In 2009, value 
added tax (VAT) increased by 3% in Latvia, 2% in Estonia and 1% in Lithuania to 21%, 20% and 19% 
respectively. Lithuania’s VAT was further hiked by 2% in 2010, and Latvia’s by 1% in 2011, though in 
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the case of the latter, the move has been reversed after a year. The number of items exempt from 
VAT, or to which reduced rate is applied decreased (KPMG, 2014), with the list being reviewed 
annually in Lithuania (Leontjeva, 2013: p.107). Social security contributions, high prior to the crisis, 
were further increased in all three countries, as the growth in the tax wedge for low-income earners 
far outpaced that of high-income earners (Figure 5.3). In summer 2010, Lithuania introduced a relief 
from social security contributions for first-time employees, though the scheme was abolished two 
years later (EC, 2014a). In Estonia, social insurance contributions were ‘capped at the level of three 
times the average wage, 4000 eur in 2014’, a change which failed to ‘address the most important 
challenge of average tax rates for low wage earners that are high in international comparison’ (OECD, 
2011c: p.113-4). Commenting on Latvia, the European Commission noted that ‘the focus on low 
income earners has been insufficient’ (EC, 2013c: p.14).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There has been an overall reluctance to put in place effective property and wealth taxes, despite not 
being considered detrimental to growth (Goujard et al., 2013). Estonian property taxes have remained 
unchanged and remain the lowest in EU (EC, 2013a: p.13), despite having ‘contributed to the previous 
housing boom’ (OECD, 2011c: p.114), while land taxes on small and medium size residential plots were 
abolished. Lithuanian government in 2011 imposed a 1% tax ‘on total family-owned property valued 
above LTL 1 million’, which, however is ‘characterised by numerous exemptions which undermine its 
efficiency’ (EC, 2014a: p.10) and an overhaul of the land tax, ‘moving it from a fixed rate of 1.5% to 
introducing a bracket of 0.01-4%.’ (Leontjeva, 2013; p.109-10). Latvian government in 2010 introduced 
a real-estate tax, whose base was broadened and made more progressive in subsequent years (EC, 
2014b: p.14). In 2013 a reform was introduced, which ‘gives local governments flexibility in choosing 
appropriate tax rates’ although its ‘results would need to be assessed at a later stage’ (EC, 2013c: p.14-
15). Additional revenue enhancements pursued by the Baltic governments are discussed in Box 5.1. 
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Box 5.1 Additional revenue enhancements in the Baltics 
With the first signs of a looming EU-wide fiscal consolidation, in late 2008 the European Commission amended the 
rules governing the disbursement of EU funds, retroactively simplifying the administrative procedures and enabling 
front-loading. This has clearly been exploited by the Baltics, Estonia and Lithuania in particular, whose absorption 
rates in 2009 in fact exceeded the amount committed for a given year (Graphs below). By end 2013, Estonia has 
been paid out almost 80% of its allocated funds in the 2007-2013 programming period – highest in the EU – with  
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Lithuania and Latvia not far 
behind. The funds have been 
used to support the bulk of 
public fixed investment, active 
labour market policies and 
prevented further cuts in the 
meagre social assistance. In fact, 
external financing still 
constitutes more than 20% of 
the budget in Estonia 
(Müürsepp, 2013: p.59) with the 
figures for the other two Baltic 
countries most likely similar.  
 
Another source of revenue came 
from re-directing part of the 
pension contributions from the 
privately funded pillars to the 
public PAYG one. In 2009, the 
Latvian government cut the 
contribution rate to the former 
from 8% to 2%. The share was 
subsequently increased to 4% in 
2013 with plans to stabilize it at 
6% in 2016. 
The Lithuanian government in 
2009 equally lowered the rate 
allocated to the private pension 
pillar from 5.5% to 3% and 
capped it at 2% later that year. 
As of 2013, employed persons 
are encouraged to pay 
additional 1% of their wages into 
private funds (2% as of 2016), for 
which the state will add an equal 
proportion of the average wage. 
In 2009, the Estonian 
government has abolished the 
4% state contribution to private 
funds, although it left the 
possibility to make private 
contributions of 2%. With fiscal 
stabilization complete by the 
end of 2012, the government 
has reinstated the pre-2009 
formula of 2+4% (Volskis, 2012). 
Source: European Commission 
Source: European Commission 
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5.2 The Visegrad Four 
Although substantial, the scope of fiscal consolidation undertaken by the Visegrad governments has 
been significantly lower than in the Baltics (Figure 5.4). On the other hand, particularly in Poland and 
Slovakia, public debt levels do not show signs of stabilization, while Hungary’s has risen dangerously 
and remains the highest in the region (Figure 5.5). 
 
 
 
 
5.2.1 Expenditure-Side Fiscal Adjustment: V4 
In an attempt to phase out inefficient expenditures, rules-based fiscal frameworks were adopted 
across the V4 (OECD, 2010a; 2012b; OECD, 2014a) with Hungary and Slovakia also establishing Fiscal 
Councils – independent bodies composed of experts producing fiscal sustainability forecasts. A debt-
brake was incorporated into the constitutions of all states apart from Czech Republic, where it has 
nevertheless been subject to extensive debate. Regarding actual public consumption, salaries of public 
sector employees were cut by between 2.5% in Czech Republic to 10% in Slovakia (Drahokoupil et al., 
p.397; OECD, 2012b: p.56). Poland represented an exception with generous pay increases in 2008/9 
across the public sector (OECD, 2010a). Hungary implemented significant expenditure cuts in 
education and healthcare, though these were only minor in the other three countries (OECD, 2012c).  
In terms of social transfers, Hungary instated two rounds of far-reaching pension reforms. The 2009 
reform increased the statutory retirement age, changed the indexation formula, abolished the 13th 
month pension and reduced pension benefits in proportion to the degree of early retirement (OECD, 
2010c: p.29). By 2011, the Hungarian government ‘announced a large-scale review of disability rights 
with an objective to bring back into the labour market 110 000 people out of a planned review of 220 
000 disability pensioners under the age of 57’, cutting by half ‘the generosity of sickness allowances’ 
while retesting existing beneficiaries ‘according to new assessment criteria’ (OECD, 2012a: p.103-4). 
Source: OECD, EU Commission. Not included is 
Hungary’s fiscal adjustment that ‘amounted to about 
7% of GDP in 2007-8’ (OECD, 2010b: p.19), as it wasn’t 
related to the 08/09 crisis. 
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The pension reform in Poland, initiated already in 2008, sought to significantly tighten access to early 
retirement by excluding numerous professions from eligibility, so that the effective number of eligible 
people dropped from roughly a million to 250,000, though granting some compensation to those who 
lost their retirement rights (OECD, 2010a: p.43). The statutory retirement age has been unified at 67 
for both genders, though the generosity of the survivors’ pension regime was maintained (OECD, 
2014b: p.33). In Slovakia, pension age was ‘increased in line with gains in life expectancy’, while 
pension growth was made ‘progressively linked to the inflation rate of a retiree consumption basket’ 
intended to make the ‘pension system more progressive’ from its previously low level (OECD, 2012b: 
p.21). In Czech Republic, a law in 2011 has foreseen the annual raising the statutory retirement age 
by two months without setting a definite target with the indexation formula later amended as well 
(OECD, 2014a: p.40). 
Unemployment benefits were slashed in the Czech Republic by 22% in 2011 and the eligibility criteria 
tightened (Drahokoupil et al. 2013: p.396). In Hungary, the duration of unemployment benefits was 
shortened from 9 to 3 months, eligibility criteria were tightened and amount capped at the level of 
the minimum wage (OECD, 2012a: p.93). In Poland, the government combined an increase in the 
generosity of unemployment benefits with a reduction in benefit duration (OECD, 2010a: p.35), 
although the system is characterized by ‘strict eligibility criteria’ so that only ‘20% of unemployed are 
eligible’ (OECD, 2014b: p.31). Transfers to families are the one expenditure category that was not cut 
in any of the countries. Hungary’s maternity leave policy has retained ‘the most generous cash benefits 
and tax breaks in OECD’ (OECD, 2012a: p.101). In 2011 the Slovak government in fact extended the 
length of maternity leave by one month to 34 weeks, accompanied by a rise in the replacement rate 
from 60 to 65% (OECD, 2012b: p.35). Poland’s child tax credit system, introduced in 2007, has later 
been expanded (OECD, 2010a: p.36, OECD, 2014), while in the Czech Republic, tax-deductions for a 
child were in 2011 increased by over 15% (Schwarz, 2012: p.39) with the plans to further increase the 
tax benefits for the second and subsequent child (Office of the Government of the Czech Republic, 
2014: p.10). 
5.2.2 Revenue-side Fiscal Adjustment: V4 
Consumption taxes have been raised in all Visegrad countries. An increase of 1% occurred in Slovakia 
and Poland to 20 and 23% respectively. In the Czech Republic, two rounds of VAT reform saw the rate 
hiked by 2%, to 21% with the reduced rate increasing over the same period by 5% to 15% (Schwarz, 
2013). However, the largest VAT increase occurred in Hungary, from 20% in 2009 to 27% by 2012, the 
highest rate in all of EU. Preferential rates for basic foods, at 18%, and medicines, at 5%, have been 
introduced (KPMG, 2014). 
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Hungary and Slovakia raised the corporate income taxes (CIT), the former by 3% in 2010, thus 
matching the regional peers at 19%, though keeping a preferential rate for SMEs, while the latter hiked 
it to 23% in 2013, after a left-leaning government took office (KPMG, 2014). While in Slovakia the hike 
was accompanied by the abolishment of the flat tax regime and the introduction of a new personal 
income tax (PIT) bracket for above-average earners at 25%, the government in Hungary went the 
opposite way and adopted a flat tax regime at 16%, cancelling the two remaining the tax brackets at 
17% and 32% (OECD, 2012a: p.90-1). In Czech Republic CIT was brought down to 19% by 2010 from 
21% in 2008, although a previously non-existent 20% tax on lotteries was introduced. As of January 
2013, annual income above the level of four times the average wage is subject to a solidarity tax of 7 
percent, while any amount below that is taxed at a flat 15% rate (KPMG, 2014). The top marginal 
bracket for PIT declined in Poland from 40 to 32% in 2009, and has been unchanged since.  
Figure 5.6 shows the evolution of the labour tax wedge in V4. Low-income earners in Slovakia and 
Poland lose a larger portion of their income in 2013 than they did in 2008, while the level remained 
stable for Czech Republic. Owing to the introduction of the new tax regime, in Hungary ‘the tax wedge 
increased for low-income earners (especially those without children) and declined significantly for 
high-income earners’ and beyond large fiscal costs ‘the negative income distribution effects… call into 
question the sustainability of the flat tax’ (OECD, 2012a: p.92). Indeed, the significant drop in tax 
wedge for high-income earners is accounted for almost uniquely by Hungary (between 2008 and 2013 
a decline of over 10%, to 49%), while it remained roughly the same in Czech Republic and Poland, 
increasing only in Slovakia in later stages.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Property or wealth taxes were increased slightly only in Czech Republic (EC, 2012c). In Slovakia, an 
increase in real estate taxes based on the market value of property was ‘considered by the 
government, but ultimately not included in the 2013 budget proposal’ (OECD, 2012b: p.61). Property 
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taxes in Poland and Hungary, particularly low in international comparison, have remained unchanged. 
As explored in Box 5.2, the Visegrad governments resorted to more unconventional revenue-
enhancing measures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 5.2 Additional revenue enhancements in the Visegrad Four 
With the exception of Poland, which by 2013 has been paid out more than 70% of total allocated funds from EU’s 
current programing period, the absorption rate of the three smaller states has remained relatively weak, below 
50% for Czech Republic and Slovakia. Moreover, the Polish government has in 2010 announced an ambitious 
privatization plan, having also relied on one-off dividends from state-owned companies (OECD, 2012d: p.13). 
While the latter move became popular in later stages in Slovakia, two other revenue enhancements became 
prominent across the V4.  
The first one was the overhaul of the pension systems in all four countries. The most drastic one occurred in 
Hungary, where the government in 2011 in effect nationalized the private pension pillar, ‘putting in doubt private 
property rights over financial assets’ (EBRD, 2011: p.135). Instituted at the end of 1990s, by 2011 the total assets 
under private management constituted 10% of GDP, granting the Hungarian public finances a comfortable surplus 
that year. The Polish government has in 2011 announced a gradual decline in contributions to the second, funded 
defined-contribution pension pillar from 7.3% to 2.3% of gross wage, crediting the difference to the public PAYG 
one (OECD, 2012d: p.19). In February 2014, 51.5% of the net assets of private pension funds (OFEs) were 
transferred to the public social security institution. Government bonds that the OFEs held, which formed a major 
part of the assets transferred, were cancelled. The move has lowered public debt by about 9.3% GDP (OECD, 
2014a: p.26). In Slovakia, soon after coming to power in 2012, the Fico government has amended the previously 
courageous contributions formula of 9+9% to 4+14% in favour of the public PAYG pillar (OECD, 2012b: p.23). While 
an outright confiscation of assets has not occurred, the future of the privately funded pillar appears uncertain. In 
Czech Republic, the Nečas government, which came to power in summer 2010, has prepared a comprehensive 
reform of the pension system, foreseeing the establishment of a previously non-existent privately funded pillar. 
Owing to a number of factors, such as very low participation in its initial stage or concerns over the accompanying 
budget shortfalls, the Sobotka government, in power since late 2013, has abolished the reform altogether. A 
multi-stakeholder commission of experts has been established to work out an alternative proposal. 
The second measure, popular particularly in Hungary and to a lesser extent in Slovakia, has been the imposition 
of a ‘crisis-tax’ on specific industry sectors. In the former, the initial temporary levy on financial institutions 
introduced in 2010 has been permanent in 2012, with an insurance premium tax coming to force in 2013 for 
insurance companies, which were previously exempt from special tax. A financial transaction tax was equally 
introduced in 2013. Other sectors facing special taxes since 2010 include energy, utilities and telecommunications 
(OECD, 2014c; p.61-62). In Slovakia the tax base of the bank levy, introduced in 2012, was broadened in 2013 to 
include household deposits. Also in 2013, temporary taxes on profits in regulated sectors (energy, insurance, 
communications, and postal services) were introduced (OECD, 2012b: p.20-2). In Czech Republic, the Sobotka 
government has kept open the possibility of introducing sectoral taxes after 2015, should further consolidation 
be needed. 
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5.3 Slovenia 
Although Slovenia has undergone comparatively mild fiscal consolidation (Figure 5.7), reflective of the 
poor economy and successive bank-recapitalization needs, its public debt has recorded the largest 
increase between 2008 and 2013 in all of CEE and shows no signs of stabilisation (Figure 5.8). 
 
5.3.1 Expenditure-Side Fiscal Adjustment: Slovenia 
While successive governments have foreseen the reduction of employment and wage cuts in public 
sector (OECD, 2012c: p.220) significant reforms largely failed to go through (OECD, 2013b: p.21). 
Concerning healthcare provision, policy on sick leave benefits and the amount of payments for extra 
time in health institutions has been made more restrictive, although from a comparatively generous 
level, while the price of medicines has been brought down. In education, rationalisation measures, 
rather than across the board cuts, were pursued (Ibid: p.21-22).  
In 2011 an extensive pension reform intended to reign in future pension expenditures has been 
rejected in a national referendum. A significantly watered-down version, amending the indexation 
formula and equalising the statutory retirement age for both genders by 2020, passed through 
parliament in December 2012 (OECD, 2013b: p.23).  Concerning family benefits, ‘subsidies for school 
and student meals were lowered, parents required to cover 30% of childcare costs for second child, 
the parental benefits for childcare were cut, the indexation of child benefits was frozen with eligibility 
conditions tightened for higher-income earners’ (Ibid: p.23). The replacement rate of unemployment 
benefits for unemployment spells longer than one year was reduced from 60 to 50%, although the 
duration of benefits up to 25 months was maintained (Ibid: p.23-24), while the eligibility criteria ‘have 
been somewhat relaxed’ (Ibid: p.34). 
5.3.2 Revenue-side Fiscal Adjustment: Slovenia 
The multi-annual programme of corporate income tax rate reductions, which started in 2012 and 
which has foreseen the decline in CIT to 15% by 2015 from 20% in 2011, has been abandoned in 2013, 
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as the CIT stabilized at 17%. On the other hand, in 2010, the flat rate on capital gains (dividends, 
interest, and capital gains) was increased by 5% to 25%. In 2013, the threshold for the personal income 
tax bracket at 41% was lifted from 1.3 times to 1.5 times the average wage and a new tax bracket of 
50% was introduced for earning above 69,315 Eur (EC, 2013d: p.21-22). As a result of the changes, the 
labour tax wedge declined slightly for all major income groups (Figure 5.9). As the 50% PIT, which kicks 
in at annual income above three times the average wage (KPMG, 2014), the likely increase in tax-
wedge for very high-income earners is not captured by the figure.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                        
Consumption tax was increased by 2% to 22% in July 2013 as a measure of last resort, though the 
government continues to apply the preferential VAT rate ‘to almost all categories of goods and 
services allowed for by the VAT Directive 2006/112/EC’ (EC, 2013d: p.22). Property and wealth taxes 
were extensively used. In 2012, an anti-crisis tax on immovable property was introduced on properties 
above a certain value (1 million EUR, later brought down to 500,000) with progressive rates ranging 
from 0.1% to 1.5%, while taxes on motor vehicles and pleasure boats were also increased (EC, 2014c).  
5.4 Fiscal Adjustment: Categorization 
The most popular revenue-side measure, implemented at some point by all governments, was an 
increase in the consumption tax. On the expenditure side, cuts to public services, healthcare in 
particular, dominated. Table 5.1 shows the share of regressive spending-side, revenue-side and overall 
measures implemented in the course of fiscal adjustment. The extent of regressiveness of measures 
was ignored. The implemented expenditure side measures in the Baltics were uniformly regressive, 
they accounted for three quarters in the Visegrad states, while in Slovenia, cuts tended to be targeted 
or complimented by neutralizing measures. On the revenue side, Latvia and Lithuania made some use 
of property taxation, the experience has been mixed in the Visegrad states with corporate and income 
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taxes moving in both directions together with limited use made of taxing wealth. Progressive revenue-
side measures outweighed the regressive ones only in Slovenia. Figure 5.10 presents the total scores. 
Table 5.1 – Regressive Measures  
 Spending-side Revenue-side Total regressive 
Baltics 100 75 90 
V4 77 67 71 
Slovenia 67 40 57 
Source: Author’s analysis 
The fiscal adjustment in the Baltics has been decisively regressive. Characteristic of the spending-side 
consolidation were across-the-board cuts of the operating costs of public services and no extension 
of the meagre social transfers. Very little effort has been made to improve social assistance targeting, 
a significant part of which continues to be redistributed to high-income households (OECD 2011c; EC 
2012b; EC 2013c). The primary means of progressive fiscal consolidation – progressive personal 
income taxation and corporate income taxes – have remained unused, while the tax wedge for low-
income earners has increased disproportionately. Property and land taxation have remained very low 
by international comparison. At 26% in 2011, Lithuania has preserved the lowest tax-to-GDP ratio in 
the EU (EC, 2013b: p.13) with Latvia and Estonia close behind. 
The regressiveness of fiscal adjustment in the Visegrad states varied, though it never reached the 
levels in the Baltics. With the exception of Hungary, cuts to public services have been comparatively 
mild. Although little effort went into improving the targeting of social assistance and transfers to the 
unemployed tended to be scaled back, support for families with children increased, both via generous 
tax expenditures and scaling up of direct transfers. The latter, together with the extensive pension 
reforms, particularly in Hungary and Poland, bear significant implications for the nature of the 
Visegrad welfare regimes. Concerning revenue enhancements, Czech Republic and Slovakia have 
implemented some form of progressive income taxation in later stages, with the latter also increasing 
corporate taxes. Nevertheless, the tax wedge for low income earners – especially those without 
children – has tended to increase, while very little use was made of property and wealth taxation.  
Fiscal adjustment in Slovenia has been overall progressive. Across the board cuts were not pursued in 
any of the spending categories, while the approved pension reform is comparatively mild. Emphasis 
has been given on scaling back social transfers to high-income households. In fact, between 2007 and 
2011 (for which latest data is available) ‘spending on social benefits and transfers in kind increased 
markedly by 3.5 percentage points of GDP… far exceeding the CEE average of 1.5% or the OECD 
average of 2.2%’ (OECD, 2013b: p.25). Revenue enhancements, often implemented as measures of 
last resort, were progressive, such as property and wealth taxation, or the increased progressiveness 
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of the personal income taxation. Only in Slovenia has the tax wedge for low-income earners slightly 
decreased, while the VAT hike was cushioned by the generous exemptions regime underpinning it. 
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6. Assessment 
This section elaborates on the factors behind the region’s varied economic performance and different 
courses of fiscal adjustment, relating both to earlier hypotheses. It is followed by a final reconstruction 
of the different logics of adjustment and the implications of this episode for the variants of capitalism 
in CEE.  
6.1 Economic and Fiscal Adjustment 
It was hypothesized earlier (section two) that countries, which had accumulated fewer external 
imbalances prior to the crisis were likely to outperform the more vulnerable ones (economic legacy 
hypothesis). An alternative, ‘economic policy hypothesis’ held that it was in fact the choice of policy 
instruments implemented in the wake of the crisis, in particular fiscal and monetary stimulus and 
smart labour market policies, that are likely to get the country to prosper. It was also noted that 
combining the two factors – low external imbalances and adequate stimulus – should make a country 
clearly outperform. While it is clear that factors beyond the proposed economic legacy and economic 
policy hypotheses decisively impacted the performance of countries, the crucial role of fiscal stimulus 
appears to be confirmed. Perhaps the most striking finding is that there has been no country that 
would clearly outperform across the three dimensions of economic performance observed in this 
article, as even the apparently superior growth models have been exposed as entailing grave 
weaknesses. 
 
The combination of ‘economic legacy’ and ‘economic policy’ hypotheses seem to go some way in 
accounting for the performance of the Visegrad states on GDP and trade. As has been noted 
elsewhere, Poland’s limited pre-crisis imbalances, sizeable fiscal stimulus and currency devaluation 
have been crucial in safeguarding economic growth and boosting exports (OECD, 2010a; p.28-30: 
EBRD, 2009: p.204-205: IMF, 2013). By pursuing these factors to their logical ends, Poland’s superior 
level of economic activity owes to its extreme positions on both the legacy and policy factors. Along 
with a balanced external account, Poland has been characterized by limited trade openness. With 
trade-to-GDP ratio at roughly half that of its regional peers, the trade channel, through which the crisis 
was imported, has not been as pronounced, thus rendering Poland the least vulnerable of all eight 
countries. Concerning the policy nexus, what stands out is Poland’s successful tapping into EU funds, 
which funded not just a one-off, but a prolonged fiscal expansion, sufficiently substituting for the 
faltering private investment. This experience seems to support the notion that ‘while a sizable upfront 
stimulus is needed, policy makers must commit to doing more… if conditions so warrant.’ (Blanchard 
et al., 2008; p.7-8). In this vein, Czech Republic’s weakness of overall economic activity, despite its low 
pre-crisis exposure and an initial policy mix similar to Poland’s, likely owes to its greater openness – 
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magnifying the crisis shock – and lack of persistence in stimulus measures, fiscal in particular. Hungary, 
which was also impacted via the financial channel and did not pursue fiscal stimulus measures, 
underperformed the most from among V4 in terms of GDP, while owing to its small size and 
dominance of few large exporters, Slovakia has undergone a purely export-led recovery, despite a 
sizeable initial slump and weak domestic demand. On the other hand, the significant growth of 
Slovakia’s exports confirms that a currency devaluation may provide, at best, a very temporary form 
of stimulus. 
However, the experience of the Baltics and Slovenia seem to contradict both the economic legacy and 
policy hypotheses. While the Baltics were characterized by the greatest pre-crisis imbalances and 
committed themselves to an unorthodox strategy of economic adjustment, following steep 
recessions, all have embarked on uninterrupted growth, significantly expanding exports. On the other 
hand, Slovenia, which accumulated significantly less external imbalances prior to 2008 and 
implemented a sizeable fiscal stimulus, has fared the worst on GDP and trade. The extent to which the 
Baltic recovery owes to internal devaluation has been subject to considerable controversy (see 
Weisbrot & Ray, 2011; Medaiskytė & Klyvienė, 2012; Kattel & Raudla, 2013a). While real unit labour 
costs have declined by on average less than 20% from their pre-crisis peak, deflation – its other key 
component – never took off (Figure 6.1). On the other hand, clearly observable from the composition 
of GDP since early 2010, extensive absorption of EU funds appears to have provided a crucial counter-
cyclical impulse throughout adjustment. In this respect, Slovenia’s fiscal stimulus, though extensive, 
has been one-off, though the extent of its contrasting experience with the Baltics points to the 
importance of other crucial factors determining post-crisis performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first is the health of the financial sector and the effectiveness of steps taken to restore it. The 
banking sectors in the Baltics, which funded the pre-crisis consumption booms, clearly underwent 
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deleveraging (Graph 6.2), with the authorities often having ‘undertaken wide-ranging reforms to 
facilitate market-based household and corporate debt restructuring’ (EBRD, 2009: p.141). In Slovenia 
however the crisis exposed deeply rooted political cronyism, soft-budget constraints and corruption 
in the state-owned banks (OECD, 2013b: p.47-8). This appears to have prevented the timely 
restoration of healthy bank balance sheets and the realization of losses from a flawed business model 
over-reliant on lending to construction. In Slovenia by 2013, ‘deleveraging has barely started’ (Ibid: 
p.59) and non-performing loans, above 18% of total loans, continue increasing, while in the Baltics 
they represent but a fraction of the figure and follow a downward trend (World Bank, 2014). The 
weakness of the financial sector also goes some length in accounting for the disappointing 
performance of Slovenia’s complex manufacturing export sector, as its operation is dependent on 
debt-financing. The Baltics’ emergent leading exporters, mainly from food, drinks and tobacco 
industries, are less dependent on debt-financing and have significantly benefited from favourable 
price developments on world markets (IMF, 2014). To account for Estonia’s superior export-
upgrading, anecdotal evidence suggests that it was the main beneficiary of the outsourcing of Nordic 
manufacturing companies, prompted by a scramble for profitability unleashed by the crisis (IMF, 2014; 
Kattel & Raudla, 2013a). Thus, the health of the financial sector – not immediately visible, but also 
crucial in the Visegrad four – and external developments – the Visegrad economies benefiting from a 
rebound in global demand for their exports – have also been crucial in impeding or promoting a 
recovery.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the extremely poor employment outcomes in the Baltics can be accounted for by the 
destruction of jobs in the previously overblown non-tradable sectors, Slovenia’s by the enduring 
malaise of the wider economy, the real puzzle seems to be why the Visegrad countries, despite their 
balanced pre-crisis growth models, considerable stimulus measures, healthy banking sectors and 
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favourable external developments, have so underperformed in employment. Two factors seem 
warranted. On the one hand, much of the pre-crisis growth and employment was accounted for by 
the expansion of previously non-existent basic services (Drahokoupil & Myant, 2011: p.190). This one-
off boost seems to have been exhausted. The other, and perhaps key, element seems to be their 
pathological dependence on foreign capital. While the pouring in of foreign investment constituted 
‘an important building stone of the previous growth model, FDI did not contribute to the recovery 
from the financial crisis’ (Fidrmuc et al., 2013: p.9; Figure 6.3). As large employment-generating 
foreign ventures have become extremely scarce, with the large manufacturers focusing on 
safeguarding the profitability of existing operations, the limits of the Visegrad growth model have 
been revealed. And together with limited employment opportunities, recent research indicates that 
the status quo also implies very low potential for the development of indigenous innovation capacities 
(Scepanovic, 2013) constraining the capacity of the Visegrad political economies to deliver rising 
prosperity beyond a certain point. The extent to which this has been noted and incorporated into 
coherent policy plans in the region’s capitals represents a research agenda in itself.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
                   
With respect to distributing the burden of fiscal adjustment, it was hypothesized earlier that because 
of looming mass lay-offs, the Baltic governments may face significant pressures for a more progressive 
course of fiscal adjustment, while Slovenia and the Visegrad states may be forced to scale down on 
under-funded social programmes, making their courses of adjustment significantly regressive 
(transformative hypothesis). The alternative, ‘path-dependence hypothesis’ held that the 
progressiveness of fiscal adjustment is likely to be determined by the extent of entrenched social 
opposition to welfare retrenchment, predicating a regressive course of adjustment in the Baltics, and 
progressive ones in Visegrad states and Slovenia. Plotted on a scatter diagram against the scope of 
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consolidation undertaken, the data provides significant support for the path-dependence hypothesis 
in the Slovenian and Baltic cases (Figure 6.4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Slovenia, targeted rather than across-the-board cuts of public services and social programmes 
dominated, while the revenue enhancements were overwhelmingly progressive. When attempted, 
the strongly represented social interests have acted to arrest the pursuit of far-reaching expenditure 
cuts, as the 2011 referendum on pension reform demonstrates. In the Baltics, overarching concerns 
over international competitiveness have not been balanced by organised welfare constituents, making 
a thoroughly regressive fiscal adjustment possible. Consistent with path-dependency, positive 
feedback loops from previous instances of fiscal consolidation most likely contributed too (Kattel & 
Raudla, 2011), while the course was ‘further supported by an external anchor, the Maastricht criteria 
and the goal to join the euro-zone… providing a mandatory exit strategy for the governments’ (Kattel 
& Raudla, 2013a: p.180). Indeed, Estonia managed to adopt the Euro in 2011, Latvia in 2014, with 
Lithuania’s Eurozone entry confirmed for 2015. However, it appears that two crucial factors made the 
significantly regressive Baltic strategy socially permissible. The first has been the extensively used exit 
option. According to official statistics, on average more than 100,000 Lithuanians, 30,000 Latvians and 
6,000 Estonians have emigrated between 2008 and 2013, with a clear peak in 2010 (Figure 6.5), though 
the actual numbers are likely much higher, as not all register when leaving. Thus, the significant drops 
in labour force have not translated into increased inactivity or pressure for extension of social safety 
nets, but mass outflows of the productive population. Second, the mildly increased inflow of re-
emitances appears to have played a supporting role for those who stayed behind, substituting for 
public welfare provision (Figure 6.6). 
Figure 6.4 – Distributional Impacts / Scope of Adjustment 
Source: Author’s analysis 
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The varying and mostly regressive character of fiscal adjustment in the Visegrad states does not fit so 
well with the path-dependent hypothesis, which had predicted an overall progressive course, and the 
persistence of sheltered groups, particularly the army of disability and early pensioners in Hungary 
and Poland respectively. However, these programs, traditionally perceived as crucial in safeguarding 
social cohesion in these countries, were swiftly scaled back. While the limited political representation 
and hence weak organised opposition to retrenchment go some way in accounting for what made the 
course possible, what perhaps made it politically desirable is the generational re-orientation of the 
Visegrad welfare states towards younger people, families in particular. The logic of Vanhuysse’s 
instrumental calculus would dictate that the unfavourable demographic forecasts and increasingly 
limited economic opportunities for the young rendered their acquiescence to the post-crisis state of 
affairs a priority for the Visegrad governments. However, such account fails to explain the distinctly 
varied character of fiscal adjustment measures in the V4.  
 
Given the unprecedented ideological polarization on the political spectrum in the Visegrad countries 
(Drahokoupil et al., 2013), one account could hold that the progressiveness of fiscal adjustment was 
likely to be determined by the ideological affiliation of a government. Accordingly, once in power, 
centre-right parties would pursue a regressive course, while centre-left governments a more 
progressive one. This could be tested on the example of Slovakia, which was the only country among 
V4 that has experienced the alternation of right-wing and left-wing governments in its course of fiscal 
adjustment. Figure 6.7 shows the respective scores on the progressiveness indicator and provides 
some support for the hypothesis, though it must be contextualized. While the centre-right Radičová 
government, in power from spring 2010, increased the VAT and implemented some cuts to public 
services, it also instated the more generous maternity leave and balanced increasing the retirement 
age by a more redistributive formula. The centre-left Fico government, in power since early 2012, has 
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abolished the flat personal income taxation, increased corporate income tax and implemented no 
more cuts to public services, although, as a result of changes in social security, the tax wedge for low-
income earners has markedly increased, while the government shied away from increased property 
taxation and maintained the higher VAT rate, despite a law from the Radičová cabinet foreseeing its 
return to the pre-crisis level in early 2014.3 
Although not captured by the indicator, it is also 
worth noting that the Fico government relied 
extensively on one-off revenue enhancements, 
while the Radičová government on improving the 
efficiency of the public sector. The fiscal 
adjustment in the Visegrad states thus appears to 
be heavily influenced by idiosyncratic factors, and 
the sheltering of one particular societal group – 
families – calls for a more detailed analysis.  
 
6.2 Crisis Adjustment and its Implications 
Characteristic of the Baltic course of adjustment has been extreme political rigidity, unmatched 
economic flexibility and enhanced social Darwinism. On the economic side, the sectoral re-orientation 
of the Baltic economies heralds the dawn of new leading export-oriented industries. However, these 
are not well oriented towards fast-growing markets (IMF, 2014: p.15,53), and their technological 
sophistication is – though to a lesser extent for Estonia – relatively low. In fact, Baltic merchandise 
exports have by 2013 stagnated on an annual basis, with Estonia even recording a slight decline 
(Statistics Estonia, 2014). In light of withering exports and still weak bank lending to businesses, which 
constraints private investment, the drivers of future growth remain uncertain. Moreover, the 
shrinking labour force and deep skill mismatches may induce labour shortages in specific industries, 
causing upward wage pressures, thus eroding the painfully gained competitiveness. Indeed, the 
Estonian Central Bank finds that in 2013 ‘labour costs rose throughout the year distinctively faster 
than productivity’ (Eesti Pank, 2014: p.4). On the social side, in implementing the drastic measures in 
defence of the prevailing social contract, the Baltic governments have effectively outsourced the social 
cost, as emigration remained the sole option for many. In so doing, the medium to long-term economic 
development and sustainability of public finances may have been seriously jeopardized. With 
uncertain and likely progressively diminishing EU transfers, the maintenance of even the meagre social 
                                                          
3 Specifically, the law stipulated that should the annual public deficit reach less than 3% of GDP, as it did for 
2013, the government is to lower the VAT to 19%, down from 20%. Fico’s cabinet has abolished the law. 
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spending seems to rely on the engagement of the foreign diasporas (OECD, 2013d). Thus, even as the 
prevailing growth model imploded, the economic and social policies have in all three countries 
remained strictly within the neo-liberal paradigm. The fact that the crisis of such proportions did not 
produce any economic or social alternatives in either of the Baltic countries indicates how deeply the 
ideology has been rooted.  
The course of adjustment in the Visegrad states has been characterized by political sclerosis, economic 
rigidity and selective social compensation. The surprisingly weak recoveries in the Visegrad states 
served to reveal a fundamentally dualistic character of their economies. While the term is most 
frequently used in relation to developing countries (Rodrik, 2011, 2014), the Visegrad economies, too, 
have at their core a foreign-owned, high-productivity industrial sector deeply integrated in the global 
economy, whose output significantly expanded once global demand picked up, thus underpinning 
post-crisis growth. However, investment into new capacities and economic activity beyond these 
leading sectors has remained particularly weak. The Visegrad states’ dependent status, together with 
a neglect of the build-up of domestic capacities, have created a real danger of settling in a low-level 
equilibrium, which, although not posing concerns over short-to-medium term sustainability, would 
imply leaving significant economic potential untapped. Although Poland has retained a lower 
dependence on the export sector, its over-reliance on public infrastructure projects spell out specific 
dangers, with the labour market suffering from the same weaknesses as its regional peers. On the 
social side, the fiscal adjustment has brought with it a fundamental reshuffling of sheltered groups. 
Indeed, the scope and likely impact of the pension reforms seriously puts in doubt the continued 
validity of perceiving the Visegrad states as ‘pensioners’ democracies’ (Vanhuysse, 2006). The 
generational shift is all the more pronounced given the partial or complete nationalization of 
accumulated private pension funds to meet present expenses, posing a direct threat to the financial 
security of future pensioners. The overall significant reliance on unconventional one-off measures to 
curtail the growth of public debt has served to postpone, rather than resolve, the issue of under-
funded welfare provision. Given the absence of concerted policy action, the future appears to be one 
of greater economic polarization and persistent fiscal stress. These internal pressures can be expected 
to find diverse forms of political expression, from the popularity of anti-establishment, through 
illiberal to outright xenophobic parties. 
In Slovenia, the crisis unleashed unprecedented political fragility, absolute economic implosion, which 
were however cushioned by the persistence of generous social compensation. The banking crisis that 
engulfed the largely state-owned banks will most likely serve to accelerate the unravelling of the neo-
corporatist socio-economic structures, their gradual erosion dating from before the crisis (Stajonevic, 
2010; Guardiancich, 2011).  The unique Slovenian growth model appears to have been broken by the 
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crisis, while an alternative has yet to be found. However, the course ahead will most likely involve the 
privatization of the viable and restructured SOEs and state banks, heralding the penetration of foreign 
economic actors, possibly bringing the next growth model closer to that of the Visegrad states. On the 
other hand, much depends on whether the previously dominant complex manufacturing sector can 
be revived and what actors might bring this recovery about. And having largely withstood the crisis 
thus far, the pressures for welfare state retrenchment are likely to be further amplified, compounded 
by the explosion of public debt. While it is still too early to make a final call, Slovenia most likely 
entered a transition comparable to the one in 1990s and accompanying it is the uncertainty over the 
future social and economic status for large segments of the population. This is bound to fuel further 
instability in the political sphere and, much like in the Visegrad states, bring to prominence populist, 
single-issue or anti-establishment parties further eroding the neo-corporatist structures. 
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Conclusion 
The crisis of 2008/9 has presented a challenge of unprecedented proportions for the CEE’s political 
economies, where three outcomes stand out. First, the pre-crisis standard of high growth rates, rising 
living standards and new economic opportunities for the CEE’s productive parts of populations appear 
to have ceased to apply. Even the seemingly balanced pre-crisis growth models have been exposed as 
entailing grave weaknesses. While in the Visegrad four overall economic activity has rebounded on 
the back of manufacturing exports, the persistent weakness of private sector investment and job 
creation points to problems beyond repair by mere stimulus measures. In Slovenia, flaws in the state-
dominated banking sector have resulted in an unforeseen and prolonged economic deterioration with 
no clear end in sight. Though somewhat alleviated by external factors, the extremely painful 
adjustment in the Baltics has implied radically changing economic prospects for large segments of the 
society. These developments bear profound implications for the nature of the social contract, as the 
crisis appears to have amplified societal rifts, particularly along education lines. As the political 
economies are drifting towards greater economic exclusiveness, the prospect of future prosperity is 
no longer universally valid. Second, despite the changing economic landscape, the contradicting goals 
of maintaining social cohesion and fiscal consolidation have largely been resolved in a way consistent 
with the prevalent logics of social compensation. Although predominantly regressive in the Visegrad 
four, the regime of selective compensation has changed in form, not in kind, as the previously 
sheltered group – pensioners – was substituted by a new one – families. Similarly, the severely 
regressive versus progressive courses of fiscal adjustment in the Baltics and Slovenia respectively have 
translated into no significant changes in the nature of the welfare regimes, which continue to present 
antipodes. However, in their attempts to preserve the existing arrangements, all three groups of states 
have drawn on resources whose future availability or attractiveness have severely diminished. A 
population exodus in the Baltics, the use of accumulated private pension funds in the Visegrad four, 
and funding public spending at the cost of skyrocketing public debt in Slovenia are tools that have 
been purely one-off, or whose use in the future would threaten a complete socio-economic 
breakdown. The persistence of the existing social structures thus endangers future vulnerability. 
Ultimately, the crisis appears to have tilted the balance more in favour of the neo-liberal paradigm. Its 
hardening in the Baltics, persistence in the Visegrad states and likely gradual convergence to some 
form of it in Slovenia indicate an explicit lack of alternatives in the realm of ideas. Thus, on course to 
greater economic polarization and increasing strain on existing mechanisms of social compensation, 
the future of the political economies in CEE, and their courses of adjustment in future episodes of 
global instability, are highly uncertain.  
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Appendix I – Economic Adjustment 
Estonia 
GDP (Expenditure Approach)                                                                                    Source: Statistics Estonia 
 
 
Foreign Trade                                                                                                               Source: Statistics Estonia 
 
 
Labour Market (Age 15-64: Unit 1000s)                                                                 Source: Statistics Estonia 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Labour 
Force  
669.6 665.7 661.5 665.4 658.5 654.6 
Total 
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Lithuania 
GDP (Expenditure Approach)                                                                                Source: Statistics Lithuania 
 
 
External Trade                                                                                                          Source: Statistics Lithuania 
 
 
Labour Market (Age 15-64: Unit 1000s)                                                              Source: Statistics Lithuania 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Labour 
Force 
1484.3 1499.6 1494.1 1453.5 1441 1436.4 
Total 
Employed 
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Latvia 
GDP (Expenditure Approach)                                                    Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 
 
 
External Trade                                                                              Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 
 
 
Labour Market (Age 15-64: Unit 1000s)                                 Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Labour 
Force 
1096.9 1068.7 1033.6 1006.7 1006.2 985.9 
Total 
Employed 
1008.8 876.8 828.8 840.6 851.8 866.5 
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Czech Republic 
GDP (Expenditure Approach)                                                                         Source: Czech Statistical Office 
 
 
Foreign Trade                                                                                                     Source: Czech Statistical Office 
 
 
Labour Market (Age 15-64: Unit 1000s)                                                       Source: Czech Statistical Office 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Labour 
Force 
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Slovakia 
GDP (Expenditure Approach)                                             Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 
 
 
Foreign Trade                                                                        Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 
 
 
Labour Market (Age 15-64: Unit 1000s)                          Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Labour 
Force 
2680.8 2680.2 2695.9 2667.5 2694.5 2703.3 
Total 
Employed 
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Hungary 
GDP (Expenditure Approach)                                                   Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
 
 
Foreign Trade                                                                              Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
 
 
Labour Market (Age 15-64: Unit 1000s)                                 Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
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Poland 
GDP (Expenditure Approach)                                                     Source: Central Statistical Office of Poland 
 
 
Poland - External Trade                                                               Source: Central Statistical Office of Poland 
 
Labour Market (Age 15-64: Unit 1000s)                                  Source: Central Statistical Office of Poland 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Labour 
Force 
16764.75 17039 16878.5 16968.25 17085.8 17101.5 
Total 
Employed 
15557.4 15629.5 15233 15312 15340.3 15313.3 
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Slovenia  
GDP (Expenditure Approach)                                     Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia 
 
 
Foreign Trade                                                                Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia 
 
 
Labour Market (Age 15-64: Unit 1000s)                  Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Labour 
Force 
1021 1016 1017 998 997 989.9 
Total 
Employed 
975.2 954.8 941.5 914.8 906.5 888.1 
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